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Content
Camiel J. Beukeboom & Christian Burgers
• Based on an integrative review we propose the SCSC framework that explicates the linguistic processes through which 
social-category stereotypes are consensualized.
• We discuss how biases in language use both result from and maintain perceived category entitativity, stereotype content, 
and essentialism.
• We distinguish biases in both the content and linguistic form of social-category labels.
• We distinguish biases in both communication content and linguistic form in descriptions of behaviors and characteristics 
of categorized individuals.
• Our integrative framework allows for a better understanding of stereotype maintaining biases in natural language
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3Introduction
An abundance of research has demonstrated the perva-
sive and fundamental role of social categorization and 
stereotypes in social perception, judgment, and interaction 
(Allport, 1954; Mackie, Hamilton, Susskind, & Rosselli, 
1996; Moskowitz, 2005; Dovidio, Hewstone, Glick, & Es-
ses, 2010). Social categories and their associated stereotypes 
are generally considered to be highly functional for people 
as they allow us to quickly and efficiently make sense of 
our complex social environment. Simultaneously, however, 
reliance on social-category stereotypes may promote preju-
dice, discrimination and intergroup conflict when people 
pre-judge categorized individuals on the basis of general-
ized (negative) stereotypic beliefs (Fiske, 1998; Macrae & 
Bodenhausen, 2000). As such, stereotypes play a funda-
mental role in many pressing societal problems relating to 
racism, sexism, ageism and intergroup tensions. 
Stereotypes are particularly consequential because they 
are socially shared across large groups of people. That is, 
people in the same context (i.e., within the same [sub-]
cultures) appear to hold similar beliefs and expectancies 
about social categories (Hogg & Reid, 2006; Oakes, 
Haslam, & Turner, 1993). The question of how stereotypes 
become shared knowledge, however, received relatively 
little research attention, as most of the stereotyping litera-
ture has focused on cognitive and individual-level pro-
cesses (Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty, & Reynolds, 
1997; Klein, Tindale, & Brauer, 2008). Except for the asser-
tion that the sharing of stereotypes is usually assumed to 
somehow occur through communication, research on the 
exact means, and the general underlying principles is rela-
tively scarce and scattered across various subfields in the 
literature. Focusing on these dynamics, however, is crucial 
to understand how stereotypes evolve, are maintained, and 
how they can possibly change (Collins & Clément, 2012; 
Mackie et al., 1996). 
In this article, we argue that, to understand how stereo-
types become shared knowledge, it is crucial to focus close-
ly on language use in communications about socially 
categorized people. Language reflects which groups are 
singled out as targets for stereotyping, and is the main car-
rier of stereotypic information we come to associate with 
these groups. In often quite subtle ways, our language re-
flects, constructs and maintains beliefs about social catego-
ries. By studying language use, we can thus gain important 
insight in the occurrence and development of social catego-
ry stereotypes within cultural groups. Current research on 
this topic has so far mainly focused on specified stereotype-
maintaining linguistic biases in experimental settings, most-
ly by manipulating artificial sentences in isolation. This 
research provided valuable insights into the link between 
categorization, stereotypic expectancies and both the pro-
duction and inferential consequences of specific linguistic 
features. Yet, for a complete understanding of these mecha-
nisms and their real-life impact, the required next step is to 
focus on natural language in which various biases may occur 
in combination. Such an approach is even more interesting 
in light of current developments in computational linguistics 
that provide more and more opportunities for automated 
analysis of natural language (Caliskan, Bryson, & Naray-
anan, 2017; Pennebaker, Mehl, & Niederhoffer, 2003; Fok-
kens, Ruigrok, Beukeboom, Gagestein, & Van Atteveldt, 
2018). To enable this type of research, a theoretical integra-
tion of the ways through which social-category knowledge 
is shared through language is much needed.
Goals and Approach 
In this article, we integrate the major strands of literature 
on stereotyping and biased language use into one frame-
work: The Social Categories and Stereotypes Communica-
tion (SCSC) framework. The SCSC framework shows how 
communication about categorized individuals determines 
the formation, dissemination, and maintenance of social-
category stereotypes within cultural groups. The framework 
distinguishes different types of communicative biases (focus-
ing on content and linguistic form of category labels and 
behavior descriptions), which have hitherto been studied in 
largely independent fields. Within each bias type, we focus 
on a number of (often implicit) linguistic means through 
which people share their social-category stereotypes. The 
SCSC framework specifies how these bias types feed and 
maintain three fundamental cognitive variables in (shared) 
social-category cognition: perceived category entitativity, 
stereotype content, and perceived essentialism of associated 
characteristics and traits. Integrating both the linguistic 
means and the cognitive antecedents and consequences 
within one comprehensive framework creates a number of 
important insights. An integrated understanding of the role 
of language use in the formation and use of stereotypes al-
lows one to monitor their occurrence and evolvement and 
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Based on a literature review, we present an integrative 
framework on the formation and maintenance of social-
category knowledge that explains how specific, observable 
linguistic aspects relate to these fundamental cognitive vari-
ables of perceived category entitativity, stereotype content 
and essentialism as both antecedents and consequences. Our 
specific focus on language use and its connections to these 
three cognitive variables provides a unique contribution that 
complements previous attempts to elucidate the mechanisms 
through which stereotype consensuality is achieved (e.g., 
Bigler & Liben, 2006; Haslam et al., 1997; Kashima, Klein, 
& Clark, 2007). 
For our review, we searched for studies within the litera-
ture on social and developmental psychology and commu-
nication studies – focusing on social categories or stereotypes 
that included linguistic variables (i.e., language content or 
form) as independent or dependent variables. Rather than 
aiming to include all studies about a limited number of bi-
ases, we aimed to maximize the variety of linguistic means 
in available research. As most of the work on category enti-
tativity and essentialism is not explicitly linked to linguistic 
variables, we independently searched for literature on these 
topics. Before we turn to reviewing the literature as the basis 
for the SCSC framework, we provide a foundational context 
and definitions.
Foundational Considerations and Definitions
Grouping individuals into categories is a fundamental 
human tendency. Social categories and their associated ste-
reotypes help people to make sense of the social world and 
to gain some predictability (Allport, 1954). The term stereo-
type refers to the cognitive representation people hold about 
a social category, consisting of beliefs and expectancies about 
probable behaviors, features and traits (Dovidio et al., 2010). 
This cognitive component can be distinguished from an af-
fective or evaluative response towards a social category 
(Amodio & Devine, 2006). The term ‘prejudice’ usually re-
fers to negative affective evaluations of a social category and 
its members. These cognitive and affective associations may 
can be translated into interventions to change stereotypic 
views. The theoretical and practical contributions will be 
explored in the general discussion. 
The different sub-fields of (psychological) research on 
stereotype bias in language use we integrate exist quite in-
dependently with little cross-reference, even though they are 
in fact closely related. Based on their focus, we distinguish 
these sub-fields as (1) biases in linguistic labeling and (2) 
biases in describing behaviors and characteristics of catego-
rized individuals. Both sub-fields in turn are further speci-
fied in terms of (a) content (i.e., meaning of labels, what is 
communicated) and (b) linguistic form (i.e., word classes, 
formulations). 
With the terms “linguistic bias”, or “biased language 
use”, we refer to instances in which language use reflects 
(shared) social-category cognition1. Thereby, we define a 
linguistic bias as a systematic asymmetry in language choice that 
reflects the social-category cognitions that are applied to (a) described 
category(ies) or individual category member(s) (adapted from Beu-
keboom, 2014). This means that language choice, in referring 
to and describing a target, varies as a function of the social 
category in which this target is categorized, or to whether 
the target’s characteristics and behaviors fit with an acti-
vated stereotype or not. Furthermore, the word ‘systematic’ 
indicates that these differences in language choice are gen-
eral patterns, as opposed to anomalies by individual speak-
ers. As noted, the different bias types manifest this 
systematic asymmetry in different ways, through language 
content (e.g., word meaning, topic choice) and/or linguistic 
forms (e.g., nouns vs. adjectives, negations vs. affirmations, 
etc.). 
A number of the reviewed linguistic bias types were 
previously linked to perceived category entitativity, stereo-
type content and perceived essentialism, mainly in the in-
ferential consequences of biased formulations in recipients 
(Beukeboom, 2014; Carnaghi et al., 2008). Perceived cate-
gory entitativity and essentialism are regarded as two fun-
damental variables in category perception and stereotyping, 
yet in the literature the terms are often conflated and vary 
in meaning (McGarty, Yzerbyt & Spears, 2002; Prentice & 
Miller, 2007). 
1 We use the term “(shared) social category cognition” to refer to the social categories that are considered meaningful (i.e., perceived 
entitativity of social categories), their associated stereotypes and perceived essentialism, which are organized in a category taxonomy, 
and which may or may not (yet) be shared between communication partners.
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stereotypic beliefs are consensually shared within an ingroup 
bolsters one’s stereotypic views (Haslam et al., 1997; Haslam 
et al., 1996), increases the expression of prejudice and dis-
crimination (Crandall et al., 2002) and even increases ste-
reotype accessibility (Sechrist & Stangor, 2001). Together, 
these processes ensure that members of subcultures internal-
ize shared stereotypes and thereby create a shared social 
reality (Kashima, 2004; Thompson & Fine, 1999; Semin, 
2008).
Communication plays a crucial role in the emergence, 
maintenance and change of consensually shared category 
stereotypes within (sub)cultures (Brauer, Judd, & Thomp-
son, 2004; Haslam et al., 1997; Schaller & Latené, 1996; 
Klein et al., 2008). Category representations are shared and 
maintained through mass media (e.g., Ramasubramanian 
2011; Schemer, 2012; Saleem, Prot, Anderson, & Lemieux, 
2017) and in interpersonal conversation (Barr & Kronmüller, 
2006; Bigler & Liben, 2006; Bratanova & Kashima, 2014; 
Ruscher & Hammer, 2006). Although stereotypes may be 
acquired from other sources than linguistic communication 
(e.g., direct interaction or observations of others’ interactions 
with category members, visual depictions of groups in the 
media, or perceived segregation of groups within a society), 
even these factors likely co-occur with linguistic categoriza-
tion in communication. When observable social groups are 
labeled and discussed in communication, they are more 
likely to become the target of stereotyping than social groups 
that are not (Bigler & Liben, 2006). Communication can thus 
function as a carrier, confirmer, as well as an accelerator in 
stereotype formation and maintenance. 
Research by Thompson, Judd, and Park (2000) showed 
how the mere act of communicating category impressions 
can increase stereotypicality. That is, after category impres-
sions had been discussed in several triads along a serial 
communication chain, participants endorsed a more extreme 
stereotype content; they ascribed many stereotype-consistent 
traits, and few inconsistent traits to the group as a whole, 
and category members were seen as more alike. Moreover, 
consensus about these impressions between participants in 
triads became greater in later triads, and was also greater 
compared to groups who did not discuss their impressions 
(Thompson et al., 2000). This study illustrates how com-
munication is front and center in the formation and consen-
sualization of stereotypes. 
In our integrative review, we focus specifically on the role 
of language in the consensualization of social category 
(in concert or independently) induce discriminatory behav-
iors (Amodio & Devine, 2006). 
Identifying a new individual as a member of a category 
allows one to draw on knowledge and experiences with 
similar individuals from that category and thus provide us 
with inferred properties that go “beyond the information 
given” (Allport, 1954). Yet, the simplification this brings has 
serious downsides. First, when relying on categories, perceiv-
ers both exaggerate similarities between individuals within 
categories (i.e., they are seen as all alike) and differences 
between categories (Allport, 1954; Brewer & Harasty, 1996; 
Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978). Second, while 
judging a categorized person based on stereotypic expectan-
cies associated with the category provides information gain 
(i.e., stored category cognition is applied to this individual), 
it also involves information loss, because the individuality 
and situational constraints of category members are ignored 
(Mackie et al., 1996). Discrimination occurs when individu-
als or groups are treated, described and/or judged based on 
generic social category associations, rather than on available 
individuating information.
Stereotypes have mostly been defined (and studied) as 
intrapersonal phenomena, as belief systems that are the 
product of mental processes in the mind of individuals. This 
focus has neglected the fact that stereotypes are in essence 
products of collections of individuals, as they become con-
sensually shared across large numbers of people within (sub)
cultures (Haslam et al 1996; Haslam et al., 1997; Holtgraves 
& Kashima, 2007; Kashima et al., 2010; Semin, 2008). 
Learning which social categories are meaningful and learn-
ing the shared expectancies with these social categories is 
part of an enculturation process in which we acquire the 
norms, values and appropriate behaviors of the culture we 
are immersed in. Creating and maintaining shared social 
categories and associated expectancies is thus rooted in our 
cultural upbringing and in childrens’ development. When 
growing up, we learn to categorize objects (e.g., animal 
types, toys) and people (e.g., based on professions or gender), 
and we learn what is expected of objects and individuals 
belonging to such categories (Bigler & Liben, 2006). 
Likewise, when joining a new subgroup or (sub)culture, 
the socialization process involves internalizing the norms 
and social-category stereotypes that prevail within this sub-
culture (Crandall, Eshleman, & O’Brien, 2002). This is il-
lustrated by research that shows powerful effects of perceived 
consensus on this internalization process. Learning that 
Camiel J. Beukeboom & Christian Burgers
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other people and their behavior, our language echoes the 
(shared) cognitive representations of any activated social 
categories associated with these people. Stereotypic beliefs 
surface in (often subtle and largely implicit) linguistic biases 
that reflect the existing stereotypic expectancies we have 
with discussed categorized individuals (Fig. 1, Arrow A). 
Moreover, linguistic biases feed shared social-category cog-
nition by sharing and confirming these existing stereotypic 
views (Fig. 1, Arrow B). These forces create a self-perpetu-
ating cycle in which social-category cognition is continu-
ously shared and maintained. 
As argued in the previous section, intrapersonal and in-
terpersonal processes go hand in hand during this process. 
The reflection of social-category cognition in biased lan-
guage use is usually regarded as a product of an intraper-
sonal process in a speaker/sender (Fig. 1, Arrow A). This 
reflection in language has immediate interpersonal conse-
quences when recipients draw (stereotypic) inferences from 
biased descriptions. Moreover, in an interactive communica-
tive situation, speaker and recipient continuously switch 
roles, and biased communication patterns become interper-
sonal as well. One person may introduce stereotypic bias in 
stereotypes. Language reflects and maintains which catego-
ries are considered as meaningful distinctive entities (i.e., 
category entitativity) and consequently become relevant 
dimensions for comparison. Second, language use in com-
munications about categorized individuals reflects and feeds 
which stereotypic characteristics are associated with a given 
category (i.e., stereotype content), and the extent to which 
these associated characteristics are perceived to be essential 
for a given category (i.e., category essentialism).
The Social Categories and Stereotypes 
Communication (SCSC) Framework
The Social Categories and Stereotypes Communication 
framework (SCSC framework, see Figure 1) integrates the 
linguistic means through which social-category cognition 
is communicated and maintained. The framework presents 
language use as the main vehicle through which shared so-
cial-category cognition is transmitted and maintained (cf. 
Beukeboom, 2014; Collins & Clément, 2012; Maass, 1999; 
Wigboldus & Douglas, 2007). When communicating about 
Figure 1. The Social Categories and Stereotypes Communication (SCSC) model.
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of stereotypes through biased language use is most likely 
within (sub)cultures, or specifically, when sender and re-
cipient are ingroup members or share a social identity. More 
specific related factors therein are the presence of shared 
social category knowledge, and norms and conventions 
about how to communicate about discussed targets. A third 
important factor concerns the relation of communication 
partners (i.e., speaker and recipient) to the discussed target. 
In much of the research reviewed below, the discussed target 
is an absent (member of a) social category to which speaker 
or recipient do not belong. Research on intergroup commu-
nication, however, shows that the social identity of the com-
munication partners vis a vis the category of a discussed 
target (i.e., ingroup, outgroup, minority?) brings an addi-
tional factor that may influence language use. We will relate 
the SCSC framework to the intergroup perspective in the 
general discussion.
In the following sections, we further explain the different 
building blocks of the SCSC framework and their mutual 
relationships. Before we get into linguistic variables, we 
discuss how communication and language use relate to both 
the described target’s perceived situations in reality and 
relevant social-category cognition. After all, when commu-
nicating about other people, our language alludes both to 
situations in reality and social-category cognition.
Input About Target’s Situations
Social-category stereotypes are generalized impressions, 
which implies that features and characteristics associated 
with a particular social category are –depending on per-
ceived category entitativity, stereotype content, and essen-
tialism, as we will discuss– expected to apply to all 
individual category members and to be stable across situa-
tions. Communication plays a crucial role in the formation 
of such generalized impressions. To understand how this 
works, it is important to note that the extent to which com-
munication about categorized people refers to specified 
people acting in particular situations (depicted in the ‘Tar-
get’s situation’ box in Figure 1), or instead generalizes across 
individuals and across situations, can vary. 
Beike and Sherman (1994) distinguished three levels of 
social information. These are usually discussed as cognitive 
levels, but we will argue they are also reflected in language 
use. The lowest, most specific, level of information refers to 
the situational behaviors of specified individual(s) or category 
an interaction, in which the other joins. One person’s utter-
ances may activate social-category cognitions in the other 
person and subsequently induce biased language use in this 
person, and so on. Also, biased utterances by speakers may 
not only induce cognitive inferences in recipients, but also 
in the speakers themselves (Fig. 1, Arrow B). That is, people’s 
cognitive representations can be shaped by how they ver-
bally describe them, for instance when they tailor their de-
scriptions to assumed beliefs of their audience (Higgins & 
Rholes, 1978; McCann & Higgins, 1990; Marsh, 2007). 
The SCSC framework (Fig. 1) explains the consensualiza-
tion of social-category cognition through biased communica-
tion about categorized targets. It consists of three main parts: 
(I) Target’s situation: Information about discussed target’s 
features and behavior (II) (Shared) social-category cognition 
(perceived category entitativity, stereotype content, per-
ceived essentialism), and (III) The different types of biases 
in language use. These different bias types in communica-
tions about categorized individuals both reflect and feed 
shared social-category cognition (hence the bidirectional 
arrows 4 and 5). These are:
(1) Biases in the type of linguistic labels used to denote and 
distinguish categories, in which we distinguish biases in: 
a) label content (i.e., meaning of the used terms)
b) linguistic form of labels
(2) Biases in describing behaviors and characteristics of catego-
rized individuals, in which we distinguish biases in 
a) communication content (i.e., what information about cat-
egorized individuals is communicated (i.e., topic promi-
nence).
b) linguistic form of descriptions (i.e., how is information 
about categorized individuals formulated (e.g., grammar, 
predicate types).
The different biases used in communication about catego-
rized targets are always embedded in a communicative con-
text. The inclusion of the communicative context in the 
framework acknowledges that biased language use may dif-
fer as a function of factors in the social context in which the 
(biased) communication takes place. These factors include, 
first, constraints and affordances of the communicative situ-
ation like, for instance, interactivity between communication 
partners: Is a recipient present, can s/he respond immedi-
ately to a speaker (e.g., face-to-face; online chat) or with a 
delay (e.g., email)? A second important factor relates to the 
relationship between communication partners. We argue 
(see above and following sections) that the consensualization 
Camiel J. Beukeboom & Christian Burgers
8 www.rcommunicationr.org
instance, when information about a category’s characteristics 
leads to the inference of the existence of associated charac-
teristics (e.g., they are helpful, so they must be nice). 
These inferences are usually considered as cognitive pro-
cesses, but they are reflected in, and mediated by, commu-
nication and language use. In Figure 1, this is visualized in 
the path from arrow C to arrow B. For instance, an observer 
of a specified target situation (e.g., a policeman beating a 
person) may communicate her perception to others in differ-
ent ways. She may directly communicate the observed infor-
mation (i.e., verbalize the low-level target behaviors; e.g., 
This policeman was beating a man) and/ or verbalize the 
high level cognitive inference she made (e.g., Policemen are 
aggressive). In turn, recipients of the communicated informa-
tion may draw their own inferences from the communicated 
information they receive, but, we will argue, this inference 
process is influenced by the ways in which information is 
verbalized. When information is formulated at a low level, 
recipients can draw their own inductive inferences or refrain 
from doing so. When information is formulated at a high 
level (e.g., Policemen are aggressive), the stereotypic infer-
ence is readily presented, while the actual situation on which 
an inference was based is not. Thus, the route from actual 
target situations to social-category cognition is often medi-
ated by communication and language use, but the input of 
information from target’s situations (Fig. 1, arrow C) may 
vary in weight (hence the dashed visualization of arrow C). 
It should be noted that, in natural language, descriptions 
of a target’s situational behavior and generic statements 
about a category as a whole can go back and forth. A single 
utterance may contain information at different levels of so-
cial information. Descriptions of the situational behavior of 
an individual category member, for instance, can be used as 
evidence or illustration for inferences about a generic social 
category (e.g., Lucy helped her mother yesterday; girls are 
really helpful). Individual category exemplars and their be-
havior may thus be invoked as evidence for the stereotypic 
characteristics of a social category (Ruscher, 1998). Depend-
ing on the communicative context, these dynamics can be-
come interactive. In dyadic conversation, a speaker’s 
utterances at one level can induce cognitive inferences and 
linguistic utterances at another level in a conversation 
member(s) (e.g., This girl helped her mother yesterday). Here, 
a clear link to a specific person(s) acting in a specified situ-
ation is drawn. Note that this information can either be 
self-observed (currently or retrieved from memory), or it may 
be learned second-hand through communication. At the 
intermediate level of information, personality characteristics 
(i.e., traits) of individuals (e.g., This girl is helpful) are men-
tioned. Such information still refers to specified individual(s), 
but is more abstracted in that it generalizes behavioral char-
acteristics across situations and is therefore not observable 
in a single actual situation. At the highest level of informa-
tion (Beike and Sherman, 1994), one refers to qualities and 
characteristics of social categories (e.g., Girls are helpful). 
At this high level of generalization, the information is sepa-
rated from both specified persons and behavioral situations. 
It refers both to a general category of unspecified individuals 
and to characteristics in generic abstracted terms that gen-
eralize across situations. Communication can thus general-
ize along two dimensions: in referring to a target (from 
specified individual[s] to a generic social category) and in 
describing behaviors (from specified situational behavior to 
enduring characteristics and traits of categorized individu-
als). 
Importantly, information at one level can lead to infer-
ences at another level. Beike and Sherman (1994) propose 
that there are three directions of inferences. First, Beike and 
Sherman (1994) refer to the process of using information 
from lower levels to draw inferences at a higher level of in-
formation as ‘induction.’ The inductive process of drawing 
inferences from the situational behaviors (lowest level) or 
traits (intermediate level) of individual category members to 
form generalized expectancies about social categories (high-
est level) corresponds to stereotype formation2 . Second, the 
process of using higher-level information to draw inferences 
about specified individuals (lower levels) is called ‘deduction’ 
(Beike & Sherman, 1994). Deduction occurs when informa-
tion at the highest level (i.e., a category stereotype) is applied 
to draw conclusions about individual category members (i.e., 
usually called stereotyping). In Figure 1, these processes are 
visualized in arrow 1. Thirdly, Beike and Sherman (1994) 
refer to the process of using information at any level to draw 
inferences at the same level as ‘analogy’. This occurs, for 
2 Drawing inferences from the lowest to intermediate level corresponds to impression formation of persons (e.g., spontaneous trait 
inferences).
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ilton & Sherman, 1996; Moskowitz, 2005). On the one hand, 
perceived entitativity may arise from the perceptual features 
of the category members that are observed in actual target’s 
situations. That is, Campbell (1958) originally argued that 
perceived category entitativity is derived from perceptual 
Gestalt principles similarity (e.g., in group members’ appear-
ance like skin color or physique), physical proximity, collec-
tive movement, and common fate among category members. 
Later research confirmed that such perceptual cues indeed 
determine the perception of category entitativity (Abelson, 
Dasgupta, Park, & Banaji, 1998; Hamilton & Sherman, 
1996). 
On the other hand, more recent broader definitions, state 
that perceived category entitativity may also, in addition to 
observable perceptual features of group members, arise from 
assumed commonality in unobservable aspects of group 
members (Brewer, Hong & Li, 2004). This could include a 
common origin or history (e.g. ancestry, cultural socializa-
tion), shared experiences or life events, common goals and 
coordinated collective action, and also common attributes 
like innate, internal dispositions (i.e. genetics, traits, person-
ality disorders; Brewer et al., 2004; Yzerbyt et al., 2004; 
Kashima, 2004; Rothbart & Park, 2004). Thus, even when 
there are no perceptual features that call for grouping, a 
group of individuals may be perceived to be high in entitativ-
ity. Based on this, we use the following operational defini-
tion: Perceived category entitativity is the extent in which a 
category is perceived as a meaningful, unified and coherent group, 
as opposed to a loose set of individuals. 
Cognitive stereotype content. 
Our operational definition of cognitive stereotype content, as 
noted above, is: the content of the cognitive representation people hold 
about a social category, consisting of beliefs and expectancies about 
probable behaviors, features, and traits (Dovidio et al., 2010). 
This cognitive representation may include observable, per-
ceptual features of the category members (e.g., skin color, 
clothing). However, much of the work on the consequences 
of stereotypes has focused on the influence of trait attributes 
(e.g., emotional, reckless, competent) that are part of a ste-
reotype, which corresponds to high-level social information 
that generalizes across individuals and situations. 
Notably, stereotypes are often argued to contain more 
complex knowledge beyond simple beliefs about the presence 
or absence of attributes or characteristics. That is, stereo-
types can include a causal structure that links various 
partner (Ruscher & Hammer, 2006). 
Conversations or stories may develop from discussing 
situational behaviors of one or a few categorized individuals 
to generalizations about the category as a whole, which, in 
turn, can induce inferences about (future) behavior of indi-
vidual category members. Importantly, communication can 
also occur at the highest level without any link to actual 
target situations. That is, people may often communicate 
generic category impressions without any reference to spec-
ified persons or situations (e.g., the Japanese are really in-
dustrious). We will argue that such high-level (versus 
low-level) communications are most likely used to convey 
existing (shared) social-category stereotypes, which in turn 
contributes to their consensualization and maintenance. In 
the next sections, we get into more detail about the specific 
linguistic variables that relate to the different levels of infor-
mation, and the ways through which they reflect and induce 
social-category cognition of senders and recipients. 
(Shared) Social-Category Cognition: Perceived 
Category Entitativity, Stereotype Content, and 
Perceived Essentialism
Before turning to biases in language use, we discuss how 
(shared) social-category cognition is structured. We distin-
guish three fundamental variables in social-category cogni-
tion: (a) perceived category entitativity (Campbell, 1958; 
McGarty, Haslam, Hutchinson, & Grace , 1995) (b) stereo-
type content, and (c) perceived category essentialism (Medin, 
1989; Medin & Ortony, 1989). In general, there is consensus 
that perceived category entitativity and essentialism play a 
fundamental and crucial role in the formation and use of 
social category stereotypes (i.e., induction and deduction), 
yet simultaneously there are different views on the defini-
tions of and relations between the constructs (see Haslam, 
Rotschild, & Ernst, 2000; McGarty et al., 2002; Prentice & 
Miller, 2007; Yzerbyt, Corneille,  & Estrada, 2001; Yzerbyt, 
Judd, & Corneille, 2004), which we explain below.
Perceived category entitativity. 
Perceived category entitativity (Campbell, 1958; McGar-
ty et al., 1995) refers to the extent to which a social category 
is perceived as a coherent, unified and meaningful entity, 
and as “having real existence.” In other words, it refers to 
the perceived “groupness” or “unity” of a group or category, 
or how closely tied together its members seem to be (Ham-
Camiel J. Beukeboom & Christian Burgers
10 www.rcommunicationr.org
in common that essentialism relates to beliefs that category 
members have stable characteristics in common, that they 
are, to some extent, basically the same (Haslam et al., 2000). 
This means that higher levels of perceived essentialism per-
mit richer inferences about category members. That is, high 
perceived essentialism means that the properties and char-
acteristics that are associated with a category are perceived 
to have a high degree of immutability (Kashima, 2004). One 
believes that category members possess a set of internal, 
dispositional and immutable characteristics that are stable 
across individual members and situations. Categorizing a 
person to a highly essentialized category thereby provides a 
rich source of inferences (i.e., much “information gain”) as 
it allows one to understand and predict a categorized target 
person’s behavior across situations. 
For the purpose of the present article, we are interested 
in how perceived essentialism of a set of characteristics and 
traits that one associates with a category comes about. Rath-
er than looking at whether one believes in an innate underly-
ing essential core (e.g., as in a genetic make-up of natural 
kinds, cf. Rothbart & Taylor, 1992) that explains common-
alities among category members, we are interested in the 
perceived content of the perceived commonalities (i.e., per-
ceived stereotype content), and the extent in which these 
commonalities are perceived to be immutable (perceived 
essentialism). We, thus, relate perceived category essential-
ism to the perceived immutability of the stereotypic charac-
teristics and traits associated with a given category (i.e., 
stereotype content). This approach aligns well with how 
essentialism has been conceptualized within the literature 
on language and stereotyping (see Beukeboom, 2014). Our 
operational definition is: Perceived category essentialism refers 
to the extent in which an associated set of characteristics is perceived 
to be immutable to its members, and stable across time and situa-
tions. 
Mutual relationships among the three variables.
As can be derived from the above definitions, perceived 
category entitativity, stereotype content, and essentialism 
are closely related to each other. First, all three variables are 
usually considered to positively relate to perceived homoge-
neity of category members. Perceived group entitativity in-
creases with perceived homogeneity, and decreasing 
diversity or variability, in one or more visible or non-visible 
aspects among group members (Brewer et al., 2004; Mc-
Garty et al. 1995; Yzerbyt et al., 2004). Likewise, stereotype 
attributes to each other and to other knowledge about the 
world. For instance, stereotypes about minorities may in-
clude assumptions regarding underlying causes about at-
tributes like ‘poor’ or ‘uneducated’. A stereotype can thus 
become ‘theory-laden’ in that it includes rich and complex 
information about the interconnectedness and causal rela-
tionships among both observable and unobservable charac-
teristics of category members (Gelman, Coley, Rosengren, 
Hartman, & Pappas, 1998; Medin, 1989). Some have argued 
that perceived essentialism about a category can serve as an 
underlying explanation for the attributes and characteristics 
that are associated with it (Yzerbyt, Rocher & Schadron, 
1997).
Perceived category essentialism. 
Perceived category essentialism (Medin, 1989; Medin & 
Ortony, 1989) has been defined and measured in various 
ways. A common view of essentialism (Rothbart & Taylor, 
1992) is that some social categories, such as race and gender, 
are perceived to possess a deeper, underlying biological es-
sence or nature, that gives rise to their surface appearances 
and behaviors, and causal connections among them. Such 
an assumed essence may be perceived to cause category 
members to be fundamentally similar to one another, and to 
behave consistently across situations (Gelman, 2003; Haslam 
et al., 2000). Rothbart and Taylor (1992) argued that such 
beliefs arise because people treat social categories like race 
and gender as if they were natural kinds rather than social 
constructs. Hence, the characteristics people assign to a 
particular social category can be perceived as if they were 
genetically inherited or so entrenched that they are almost 
impossible to change (Rothbart & Taylor, 1992; Kashima, 
2004). 
However, social categories that do not share an obvious 
genetic core – like plumbers or hipsters – can also be en-
dowed with perceptions of essentialism. Essentialism has 
often been studied with respect to perceptions about spe-
cific characteristics associated with social categories (e.g., 
emotional, artistic, likes to draw paintings; e.g., Wigboldus, 
Semin, & Spears, 2000; Beukeboom, Finkenauer, & Wig-
boldus, 2010; Carnaghi et al. 2008). Higher perceived es-
sentialism then relates to beliefs that these specified 
characteristics are stable, unchangeable, and dispositional, 
and have a high repetition likelihood across category mem-
bers and situations (see Beukeboom, 2014 for an overview). 
Although different in focus, the different approaches have 
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group as a whole. In other words, for categories high in en-
titativity, participants draw a general essentialistic impres-
sion about the group a whole, and seize to view members as 
individuals (i.e., high-level inference; Beike & Sherman, 
1994). Once this generic group impression is formed, it is 
applied (i.e., deduction) to all other individual group mem-
bers (Crawford et al., 2002). In contrast, information about 
members of low entitative groups (i.e., aggregates of indi-
viduals) must be processed and learned individually. Here, 
members are treated as unique individuals, and information 
related to specific individuals is stored separately in memo-
ry. Once a behavior–trait association is made for one indi-
vidual, no further generalizations, to other individuals or to 
the group as a whole, are made (Crawford et al., 2002). Thus, 
with low entitativity, information remains at a low or inter-
mediate level (Beike & Sherman, 1994) and is processed in 
an individuated piecemeal manner (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990).
In sum, with increasing perceived entitativity, it is more 
likely that a generalized stereotypic impression consisting of 
a set of associated essential characteristics is formed. This 
stereotype is then associated with all individual members of 
the group, which allows perceivers to generalize beyond the 
characteristics of the individual members. However, this 
information gain comes with a loss; recollection of specific 
information about individual members becomes more dif-
ficult. It is more difficult to remember which of the members 
of the group performed a behavior that initially induced the 
inference of the trait, as all of the group members are associ-
ated with the trait implied by the behavior. Several other 
studies confirm these ideas (e.g., Yzerbyt et al. 2001; Yzerbyt, 
Rogier & Fiske, 1998). 
In this article, we argue that specific aspects of language 
use relate in a predictable way to the formation and mainte-
nance of perceived category entitativity, stereotype content 
and essentialism. In the following section, we review and 
integrate research from various fields to elaborate and sup-
port these ideas. 
content by definition includes generalizations across indi-
vidual members, and this perception increases to the extent 
that perceivers assume that the set of associated character-
istics are essential (immutable) to the group as a whole. 
Although there are quite different views on the defini-
tions of, and relations between these constructs3 , in general 
scholars agree that it is valuable to consider entitativity and 
essentialism as distinct constructs (Yzerbyt et al., 1997, 
2004). That is, social categories may independently vary in 
the extent to which they are perceived to have entitativity, 
the stereotype content they become associated with, and the 
extent in which associated stereotypic characteristics are 
perceived to be essential (Haslam et al., 2000; Prentice & 
Miller, 2007). Simultaneously, the constructs are closely and 
causally related to each other, in a reciprocal manner (Fig. 
1, arrow 3). On the one hand, a minimal level of perceived 
entitativity is needed before a category can acquire a stereo-
typic impression and essentialism. The more a collection of 
individuals is perceived to have high (as compared to low) 
entitativity, the more perceivers tend towards an inductive 
process to find the stereotypic characteristics considered to 
be essential to its members (Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; 
Spencer-Rodgers, Hamilton & Sherman, 2007; Yzerbyt et 
al., 1997). On the other hand, high essentialism may also 
induce higher perceived entitativity. That is, believing that 
a set of essential, shared characteristics exists for a category 
may, in turn, be taken as evidence to believe in the categories 
unity and real existence (i.e., its entitativity; Kashima 2004; 
Yzerbyt et al., 2004). 
Treating entitativity and essentialism as distinct con-
structs also helps to explain their crucial role in the forma-
tion and use of social category stereotypes. For instance, 
using a savings-in-relearning paradigm, Crawford, Sherman, 
and Hamilton (2002) showed that for groups high (compared 
to low) in entitativity, trait inferences drawn from individu-
al group members’ behaviors (i.e., induction) were more 
likely to be generalized to other group members and the 
3 In the literature, social category entitativity and essentialism have been defined in quite different ways and the terms are sometimes 
used interchangeably (Yzerbyt et al., 2004; Haslam et al., 2000; 2004). Depending on how broad the constructs are defined, they can 
either be considered to share a nested, hierarchical, or overlapping structure (Yzerbyt et al., 2004). Note that when entitativity is defined 
according to the mentioned broad definition (i.e., as arising from assumed unobservable common attributes; Brewer et al., 2004) entita-
tivity begins to overlap with essentialism. Assumed shared essential traits among a group of individuals (e.g., extraverts) could induce 
perceived entitativity (i.e., they are seen as a coherent group).
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entitativity (McGarty et al., 1995).
More direct evidence comes from research in child de-
velopment. Linkages between linguistic labels and category 
perception and formation already emerge early in language 
acquisition (Waxman & Markow, 1995). Simply introducing 
a label in conjunction with a number of individual items 
facilitates pre-school children to form categories, as shown 
in a better performance in a sorting task compared to chil-
dren who hear no labels. These effects occur both for famil-
iar English labels (e.g., animals, clothing, food) as well as for 
foreign Japanese words (e.g., dobutzus, kimonos, gohans; 
Waxman & Gelman, 1986). Once a linguistic label is used 
to refer to a group of objects or individuals, this group is 
perceived as a more unified and coherent whole that is dis-
tinguished from other categories within a conceptual hier-
archical taxonomy. Labeling thus appears to be related to 
higher perceived category entitativity. Other research also 
suggests relationships of category labeling with stereotype 
content and perceived essentialism. These linkages become 
more apparent when we specifically focus on two aspects of 
labels; (a) their content (i.e., label meaning) and (b) their 
linguistic form.
(a) Biases in label content. 
As noted above, a label functions to refer to a category of 
people that exists in reality. The label content thus commu-
nicates which category of people is referred to, and thereby 
conveys category boundaries and the category’s position in 
a hierarchical social-category taxonomy. Labels vary in how 
broad or narrow they are (Anderson, 1991; Rosch, Mervis, 
Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976). They can range from 
superordinate broad levels (e.g., gender, age groups, racial 
and ethnic groups), to more narrow subordinate levels of 
aggregation (e.g., specific and specialized professions; Rich-
ards & Hewstone, 2001). 
Aside from referring to a given category and conveying 
category boundaries, a label functions to convey meaning 
about a category and its members. First, conveying meaning 
(cf. information gain) occurs because labels become associ-
ated with a set of stereotypic characteristics. When a group 
of individuals is repeatedly referred to with a given linguistic 
label (e.g., immigrants), it will gain in entitativity, which in 
turn facilitates stereotype formation (cf. Crawford et al., 
2002). Hearing or reading a given linguistic category label 
can, in turn, activate (i.e., prime) the stereotype content that 
has become associated with this label (Dijksterhuis & Van 
Biased Language Use
Based on our integrative review, we argue that social-
category cognition (i.e., the perceived entitativity, stereotype 
content, and essentialism of social categories) is both re-
flected in, and maintained by, language use, specifically by 
(1) biases in linguistic labeling, and (2) biases in describing 
the behaviors and characteristics of categorized individuals. 
Thereby, language use plays a crucial role in the consensu-
alization of social category cognition within cultural groups. 
In Figure 1, these bias types are embedded in a ‘Communi-
cative context’ box. This acknowledges that biased language 
use may differ as a function of factors related to the social 
context and relationships between communication partners 
and the target. We will elaborate on this in the following 
sections and the general discussion.
(1) Biases in linguistic labeling. 
The first bias type deals with the category labels used to 
refer to individuals or groups. Different label types (in con-
tent and linguistic form) will be used depending on existing 
social-category cognition that may or may not (yet) be shared 
within a given subculture. Specifically, we will argue that 
label use both results from perceived category entitativity, 
stereotype content, and essentialism in speakers, and also 
feeds and maintains this in message recipients, and arguably 
also in speakers (Figure 1, arrows 4). 
A first indication for the link between category labeling 
and perceived category entitativity comes from research on 
category perception. Several studies (e.g., Corneille & Judd, 
1999; McGarty & Turner, 1992) have shown that the use of 
even a trivial category label in referring to judged objects or 
individuals induces perceivers to exaggerate similarities 
within categories (i.e., assimilation) and to accentuate the 
differences between categories (i.e., contrast). For instance, 
Foroni and Rothbart (2011, 2013) showed that the presence 
of a label (compared to no label) with silhouette drawings of 
body types (e.g., anorexic, normal, obese) reduced perceived 
differences between members of the same category (i.e., they 
are judged as more alike), while the perceived differences 
between members of different labeled categories increased. 
Labels thus play an important role in conveying category 
boundaries (Rothbart, Davis-Stitt & Hill, 1997). It appears 
that once a (observable) group is linguistically labeled, it is 
explicitly defined and distinguished from other groups, and 
it thereby gains in its apparent reality and perceived 
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type content, is demonstrated by cases in which group labels 
with an offensive connotation are substituted by politically 
correct labels (Maass et al., 2014). Such politically correct 
substitute terms usually have a euphemistic connotation, but 
tend to lose their positive meaning over time when the label 
becomes associated with the same negative stereotypic as-
sociations, thus creating the need for repeated replacements. 
Examples for this process, known as a “euphemism tread-
mill”, can be found in labels for mental disability (moron, 
mentally retarded, mentally challenged, learning difficulties, 
special needs) or race (from the use of the N-word as a de-
rogatory group label to the use of the label ‘people of color’; 
Maass et al., 2014).
In sum, the label content functions to identify a given 
category of people, and thereby conveys category boundaries 
and a position in a hierarchical taxonomy. We argue that 
referring to a category using different label types goes hand 
in hand with perceived category entitativity. When a cate-
gory is conventionally labeled within a subculture, it gains 
in perceived entitativity, and vice versa. 
Second, the label content plays a role in communicating 
the content of the set of stereotypic characteristics associ-
ated with a given category. As noted, this relationship is 
two-directional. On the one hand, the use of linguistic cat-
egory labels can activate (i.e., prime) the stereotype content 
that has become associated with this label, or bring an ad-
ditional semantic meaning that eventually becomes part of 
the (shared) category representation. On the other hand, 
existing stereotype content can induce the use of associated 
linguistic category labels. That is, people who hold negative 
stereotype views are expected to be more likely to use de-
rogatory labels. Importantly, however, the choice to use such 
labels depends on social norms and whether it is considered 
appropriate in the communicative context (Crandall et al., 
2002; Croom, 2013). In social groups in which negative 
stereotypes prevail, the use of derogatory labels or slurs will 
be relatively acceptable (Crandall et al., 2002; Croom, 2013; 
Fasoli et al., 2015), and this, in turn, can contribute to the 
consensualization of such negative stereotypic views.
(b) Biases in the linguistic form of  labels. 
A second aspect of linguistic labels lies in their linguistic 
form. Interestingly, different linguistic forms of labels are 
related to different cognitive inferences about categories. 
Around preschool age, children become sensitive to the 
grammatical form of words (nouns, verbs, adjectives) and 
Knippenberg, 1996). Linguistic labels thus function as verbal 
tags for social stereotypes (Mullen, 2001).
Second, the semantic meaning or conceptual content of 
the used linguistic term may bring an additional meaning. 
Often, different labels can be used to refer to the same social 
category. For instance, to refer to soccer spectators one can 
use various labels, like ‘fans,’ ‘supporters’ or ‘hooligans.’ To 
refer to ‘immigrants,’ one can use negative labels like ‘for-
tune-seekers,’ ‘aliens,’ ‘outsiders,’ or highly negative meta-
phorical terms like ‘parasites’ (Musolff, 2014). Some labels 
will be used mainly as a descriptive term, to refer to and 
identify individuals or groups in an affectively neutral man-
ner (e.g., spectators, plumbers). Other labels, however, have 
a stronger positive or negative connotation. Derogatory la-
bels and social slurs, are more likely used when one intends 
to convey negative prejudice, and to qualify categories or 
category members in a disparaging manner (Croom, 2013; 
Fasoli, Carnaghi, & Paladino, 2015).
Different labels for the same category may thus be associ-
ated to a different cognitive representation (i.e., stereotype 
content) and may convey different affective evaluations (i.e., 
prejudice; see the distinction between cognitive complexity 
and valence of ethnophaulisms; Mullen, 2001; Mullen and 
Johnson, 1993). Derogatory group labels or stigma are obvi-
ously associated with a different more negative stereotype 
content and associated affective response than neutral labels 
(Carnaghi & Maass, 2007; Dovidio, Major, & Crocker, 2000; 
Maass, Suitner, & Merkel, 2014; Smith, 2007). Sexist de-
rogatory slurs (e.g., “bitch,” “whore”; see Fasoli et al., 2015), 
for instance, derogate women by conveying hostile stereo-
typic expectancies about women (i.e., promiscuity, sexual 
looseness, low morality), while simultaneously conveying 
negative affect (e.g., contempt and disgust). 
In a text or conversation about a category and its mem-
bers, various terms may be used. After identifying a catego-
ry using a (more or less neutral) descriptive label (e.g., 
immigrants) one may introduce additional labels (e.g., para-
sites, fortune-seekers) to qualify the category or specified 
members. By means of metaphorical (e.g., parasite) and 
non-metaphorical label-terms (e.g., outsider), speakers can 
convey a semantic meaning that is applied to (members of) 
the category. Such negatively or positively connotated terms 
may, in turn, induce new stereotypic associations with the 
category immigrants. 
The fact that linguistic labels both bring a semantic 
meaning, and over time becomes associated with a stereo-
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less likely categorized into alternative categories (e.g., an 
artist). By contrast, adjectival descriptions (e.g., athletic) 
more easily allow alternatives (i.e., somebody can be both 
athletic and artistic; Carnaghi et al., 2008; see also Waxman, 
1990). Nouns thus function as stronger category labels, and, 
compared to adjectives, can be expected to relate to higher 
perceived category entitativity.
Moreover, nouns induce stronger inferences regarding 
the perceived essentialism or immutability of associated 
stereotypic characteristics. When persons are described with 
a noun (e.g., Kevin is a traditionalist), compared to a cor-
responding adjective (e.g., Kevin is traditional), category-
congruent behavioral preferences (e.g., sends Christmas 
postcards) are seen as a more profound and unchangeable, 
to have a higher enduringness, and higher likelihood of fu-
ture repetition (Carnaghi et al., 2008). Likewise, Gelman 
and Heyman (1999) showed that children of ages five and 
seven inferred that a person’s characteristics (e.g., Rose eats 
a lot of carrots) were more stable and enduring when they 
were described with a noun label (e.g., She is a carrot eater) 
compared to when they were presented in a descriptive 
phrase (e.g., She eats carrots whenever she can). 
The above studies show effects of a label’s linguistic form 
on recipients’ inductive inferences (Figure 1, Arrow B). Car-
naghi et al. (2008, study 6) also showed experimental effects 
of speakers’ label use as a result of perceived category es-
sentialism (Figure 1, Arrow A). For instance, participants 
who were led to believe that athletic abilities are genetically 
determined (high essentialism) were more likely to choose 
a noun label than an adjective to describe an individual 
target person active in athletic sports (athlete), compared to 
participants who believed athletic abilities are a transient 
characteristic and the result of training (low essentialism). 
Perceptions of high essentialism thus also induce the use of 
stronger noun labels.
Another important distinction in the linguistic form of 
labels lies in whether labels are formulated as generic (e.g., 
Germans are …), subset (e.g., these Germans are …), subtype 
(e.g., female Germans are …) or individual (e.g., This Ger-
man is…) references. Although references can be expressed 
in different and quite complicated ways (Cimpian & Mark-
man, 2008), preschool children are already sensitive to cues 
assign particular types of meanings to them (Brown, 1957). 
When children hear nouns, they take these as referring to 
entities. That is, they see common nouns (e.g., mothers, 
teachers) either as a reference to the category to which per-
sons, locations or objects belong (Waxman, 1990; Waxman 
& Markow, 1995) or as a reference to unique individual 
objects, locations or persons (i.e., proper nouns; Lucy, Lon-
don). Nouns thus function to denote taxonomic relations 
and distinctions among classes or categories in a conceptual 
hierarchy with various levels of abstraction (Waxman, 1990). 
In contrast, other linguistic forms like adjectives serve 
other purposes. Children soon learn that, while nouns refer 
to categories, adjectives refer to properties of objects and to 
subordinate level distinctions (Hall, Waxman & Hurwitz, 
1993; Markman & Hutchinson, 1984; Waxman & Gelman, 
1986). Indeed, nouns can be used to refer to entities (indi-
viduals or categories) in the function of sentence subject or 
object, while single adjectives4 cannot. Adjectives typically 
function to denote one of many qualities that a person or 
category may possess (Carnaghi et al., 2008). Nevertheless, 
even though, in most situation, single adjectives strictly are 
not used as referring labels, the comparison between nouns 
and adjectives is interesting, because in person descriptions 
nouns and adjectives can be used in an exceedingly similar 
manner (e.g., she is an athlete [noun] vs. she is athletic [adjec-
tive]). In such descriptions, nouns and adjectives induce 
different inferences that relate to both category entitativity, 
stereotype content, and essentialism (Carnaghi et al., 2008). 
First, noun labels activate the stereotype content that is 
associated with the labeled category, while adjectives do not. 
That is, when a target person is labeled using a noun (vs. 
adjective), this more strongly induces stereotype-congruent 
inferences about the target, while simultaneously inhibiting 
counter-stereotypical inferences. For instance, when a target 
person is described as “a Jew,” recipients tend to more 
strongly expect other typically Jewish habits compared to 
when he or she is described as “Jewish” (Carnaghi et al., 
2008). 
Second, nouns have an either-or quality (e.g., one either 
is or is not an athlete) while adjectives can vary in degree (e.g., 
one can be a little or very athletic). Consequently, once a 
person is classified using a noun (e.g., an athlete) they are 
4 When adjectives are used in labels referring to individuals or categories they are usually combined with a noun, as in subtype labels 
(e.g., female surgeon; see below).
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thereby also imply that a category is a coherent, stable en-
tity (Gelman et al., 2004). 
A number of studies have shown the important role of 
generics in forming perceptions of category entitativity and 
essentialism. Both Gelman et al. (2010) and Rhodes et al. 
(2012) conducted a series of experiments in which pre-school 
children and adults were introduced to a novel and fictional 
category labeled “Zarpies” via an illustrated picture book. 
The characteristics were presented on separate pages with 
pictures of Zarpie exemplars accompanied by either generic 
noun labels (e.g., Zarpies hate ice cream), individual noun 
labels (e.g., This Zarpie hates ice cream), or no-label (e.g., 
This hates ice cream; Gelman et al., 2010). 
First, using various methods, these studies demonstrate 
that generics, compared to both individual and no-label, 
induced stronger category–characteristics links (i.e., stereo-
type content). When Zarpie characteristics were learned by 
means of generic sentences, respondents were likelier to 
mention these characteristics as explanations for behavior 
of Zarpie exemplars, to generalize them to novel Zarpie 
exemplars, and to expect that category members are alike in 
other unmentioned characteristics as well (Gelman et al., 
2010).
Second, the studies show that generics led to stronger 
perceived essentialism. When characteristics were learned 
from generic noun labels, compared to individual noun label 
and no-label, they were expected to be innate and inevitable, 
and stable across time (Gelman et al., 2010; Rhodes et al., 
2012). Moreover, after being exposed to descriptions with 
generics, respondents were likelier to provide dispositional, 
rather than situational, explanations for Zarpie behaviors 
(Gelman et al., 2010). The individual noun label still induced 
stronger category essentialism compared to no label, but the 
use of a generic label led to the highest level of perceived 
category essentialism (Gelman et al., 2010; Rhodes et al., 
2012). 
Interestingly, Rhodes et al. (2012) also showed that the 
use of generic labels is related to perceived entitativity. Par-
ents who were first led to believe that Zarpies are a distinct 
kind of people with many biological and cultural differences 
from other social groups (i.e., high entitativity), rather than 
a non-distinct kind (i.e., low entitativity5), used more generic 
that indicate whether a label refers to a generic category (i.e., 
a kind) a specific subset of exemplars, or a specific exemplar 
(e.g., cats have tails, the cats have tails, the cat has a tail; 
Gelman & Raman, 2003). Note that such generic versus 
specific exemplar labels respectively correspond to the high 
and low levels of target references described above (Beike & 
Sherman, 1994).
Generic references have received particular research in-
terest in developmental psychology, as these are considered 
to play a crucial role in the transmission of category knowl-
edge (Cimpian & Markman, 2008, 2009; Gelman et al. 
1998). Generic sentences combine generic labels with a char-
acteristic and thereby express generalizations both across 
individual category members and situations (e.g., Boys play 
with trucks; Girls are sweet). These utterances thus corre-
spond to the high level of social information as described by 
Beike and Sherman (1994). Generic sentences, or generics, 
explicitly convey that a characteristic applies to an entire 
category. Importantly, this type of category–characteristic 
mapping cannot be observed directly, nor can this informa-
tion be illustrated for someone else without the use of lan-
guage (Gelman, Taylor, Nguyen, Leaper, & Bigler, 2004). 
Generics are frequent in child-directed speech, and argued 
to be important in children’s conceptual development (Gel-
man, 2003; Gelman, Ware, & Kleinberg, 2010).
In the English language (and many other languages), 
generic sentences can be expressed with bare plural nouns 
(e.g., Boys play with trucks), but also with definite singulars 
(e.g., The elephant is found in Africa and Asia), or indefinite 
singular articles (e.g., A girl wears pink), and are accompa-
nied by present-tense verbs (Gelman et al., 2004; Rhodes, 
Leslie, & Tworek, 2012). Unlike utterances containing uni-
versal quantifiers such as all, every, or each, generic state-
ments allow for exceptions. That is, while a single 
counterexample would disprove the generalization “All boys 
play with trucks”, the generic statement “Boys play with 
trucks” remains true even after an encounter with a single 
boy who does not. This feature makes generic sentences ide-
ally suited to convey characteristics that are typical for a 
category but that can nevertheless admit exceptions. They 
convey qualities that are stable (non-accidental), enduring, 
and persistent across time and situations (i.e., essential), and 
5 Note that Rhodes et al. (2012) use a broad definition of essentialism and use the term essentialism here to include perceptions of 
entitativity.
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ry knowledge determines which categories are applied, 
which in turn is reflected in the labels used. Research on the 
categorization process demonstrates that people are most 
likely to apply categories that are cognitively salient (Fiske 
& Neuberg, 1990; Mackie et al., 1996). These findings sug-
gest that categories that are part of existing (shared) social 
category knowledge, particularly chronically salient catego-
ries with high perceived entitativity7 that are regularly acti-
vated, have an advantage of being activated again, and to be 
linguistically labeled. By means of label use subcultures thus 
develop their own taxonomy of social categories that are 
consensually considered as distinct and meaningful “kinds” 
(cf. Rosch et al., 1976). Some cultures may distinguish a 
given category of people by conventionally labeling it, while 
other subcultures do not label and distinguish it.
Second, label use is simultaneously shaped by available 
information about the target’s situation. Research on the 
categorization process shows that category activation also 
depends on fit, which is the degree of overlap between the 
observed or discussed features and behaviors of a target and 
the characteristics denoted in a given cognitive category 
representation (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Mackie et al., 1996). 
Category activation and label use are thus shaped by avail-
able information (e.g., observed or communicated) about 
features and behaviors of a discussed target (Fig. 1, Arrows 
1 and C). People are expected to seek the strongest category 
with the most information gain in a given situation, in order 
to maximize the accuracy of predictive inference (Anderson, 
1991; Hamilton & Sherman, 1996). 
This cognitive search for the most fitting categorization 
to apply to a given target situation can be characterized as a 
narrowing process. When inconsistencies are perceived be-
tween a target person’s features and behavior and an acti-
vated category representation (i.e., fit is low; e.g., a person 
does not behave in stereotypical ways), this will prompt a 
perceiver to process more deeply. First, inconsistencies may 
prompt perceivers to search for a more sensible or specified 
references when they talked about them to their child from 
a picture book without accompanying text (Rhodes et al., 
2012, Study 3).
Section summary.
In sum, research shows clear linkages between the con-
tent and linguistic form of labels and perceived category 
entitativity, stereotype content, and essentialism. First, the 
use of any category label (compared to no label) both reflects 
and induces a higher level of category entitativity. Second, 
particular types of labels (in content and linguistic forms) 
reflect and induce differences in perceived category entitativ-
ity, stereotype content, and essentialism. Verbal descriptions 
and adjectival references imply lower entitativity and essen-
tialism than noun labels. Noun labels, particularly in ge-
neric form, imply the highest entitativity and perceived 
essentialism of specified characteristics. To the extent that 
a category is labeled as a stronger entity, the likelier it is to 
acquire a set of associated characteristics, and the likelier 
these characteristics will be seen as essential to all members 
of the category6.  
The role of  biased labeling in the consensualization of  
social category cognition.
The SCSC framework explains how label use contributes 
to the consensualization of social category cognition. In this 
section we further discuss three important aspects of this 
process: (a) label use reflects and shapes social category 
cognition; while (b) label use is simultaneously shaped by a 
perceived reality (the target’s situation), and (c) by processes 
in the communicative situation. 
First, the above sections show that the use of different 
labels is biased by social-category knowledge, by reflecting 
(and inducing) perceived category entitativity, stereotype 
content, and essentialism. Thus, when we communicate 
about other people (about targets in specified target situa-
tions, but also in generalized terms), existing social-catego-
6 Note that, in natural text or conversation, after an initial categorization using a linguistic label, other linguistic cues may further 
determine perceived category entitativity and essentialism. The use of pronouns, for instance can provide further verbal cues about 
targets’ category membership (e.g., he vs. she), their position in a category hierarchy (e.g., he vs. they) and the boundaries between groups 
(e.g., we, they, us vs. them).
7  It seems reasonable to assume that perceived category entitativity and essentialism, and the use of stronger noun labels, are positively 
related to chronic salience. We are, however, not aware of any research that supports this hypothesis.
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male nurse; Stahlberg, Braun, Irmen, & Sczesny, 2007; Ro-
maine, 2001), while this is not expected when the person’s 
sex fits the respective gender role (Beukeboom, 2014). Note 
that such new distinctions may at first be marked with ad-
jectival phrases, but in time these subtypes may gain in sa-
lience and entitativity. They may then acquire a single noun 
label (see Waxman, 1990), gain in essentialism, and evolve 
in a strong category with a rich stereotype (e.g., hipsters). 
In sum, the use of category labels is in various ways bi-
ased by existing social-category cognition. Chronically sa-
lient categories have an advantage, but the fit with a 
discussed target’s features and behavior affects label choice. 
Stronger noun labels are likely reserved for targets showing 
expectancy consistent features and behavior for the applied 
category, i.e., the typical category member. In contrast, tar-
gets showing characteristics or behaviors that are inconsis-
tent with activated social-category cognition are likelier 
referred to with more narrow category labels, with modified 
or compound noun labels (i.e., subtypes), adjectives, or de-
scriptive phrases. Note that these tendencies to distinctly 
label inconsistent targets outside a generic category serve to 
maintain existing social category stereotypes.
Finally, the third aspect depicted in the SCSC framework 
explains that the above processes are shaped by factors in 
the communicative context. That is, the process of seeking 
the most fitting and currently relevant categorization is de-
termined in the interaction between conversation partners, 
and shaped by factors like the assumed knowledge in, and 
perceived consensus with, message recipients. This notion 
aligns with research based on a well-known theory in prag-
matics: Relevance Theory (Wilson & Sperber, 2004) de-
scribes how people strive to make their communications 
optimally relevant, both in terms of activated intrapersonal 
cognitions (cf., fit), interpersonal processes and contextual 
meaning. Narrowing utterances (i.e., lexical narrowing) is 
one way to achieve this relevance (Gibbs & Bryant, 2008; 
van der Henst, Carles, & Sperber, 2002). In formulating ut-
terances, people strive to achieve optimal relevance while 
minimizing the cognitive effort needed for themselves and 
their addressees; a narrower utterance is thus only provided 
when required (Sperber & Wilson, 1995). 
Another factor in the communicative context, as men-
tioned before, are social norms about which labels are con-
sidered appropriate to identify and qualify discussed targets. 
Social norms may affect the use of labels with varying con-
tent. Particularly labels with a highly negative connotation 
alternative categorization, resulting in re-categorization or 
subtyping, or ultimately (with enough time, resources, and 
motivation) a piecemeal integration of individual attributes 
(Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Hamilton & Sherman, 1996). Thus, 
inconsistencies between a target’s situational information 
and activated existing social-category cognition will prompt 
a tendency towards lower levels of information (cf. Beike & 
Sherman, 1994).
This narrowing process can be observed in various ways 
in the labels that are used in communications about other 
people, both in terms of label content (i.e., the categories 
position in a hierarchy), and in linguistic form. First, to refer 
to a target person showing behavior that fits the category 
stereotype, people should be inclined to readily use a chron-
ically salient and strong (i.e., noun) category label. However, 
when a target person’s attributes and behaviors are incongru-
ent with the characteristics denoted in an activated category 
representation, or when the communicative context calls for 
a specification (e.g., a critical response), people typically tend 
to narrow down to subordinate categories. This process can 
result in finding an alternative subordinate category (e.g., 
“chemist” rather than a superordinate label “scientist”). In 
this case, an alternative category with distinct entitativity is 
referred to with an independent noun label (i.e., an indepen-
dent representation; Rothbart & Park, 2004). In finding such 
alternative categories, categories that are relatively high in 
cognitive salience should again have an advantage.
When fit is low, but re-categorization is not possible, 
people are likely to specify a subtype within a previously 
activated category (Hilton & Von Hippel 1990; Richards & 
Hewstone, 2001; Weber & Crocker, 1983). Subtyping is lin-
guistically usually reflected in the use of modified noun la-
bels like “friendly hooligan” or “tough woman” (adjective + 
noun) or compound nouns like “career women,” “desk of-
ficer” or “math girl” (noun + noun). By creating subtypes, 
exceptions to the rule are placed in a subcategory that is 
narrower than the broad group, and this allows one to pre-
serve the existing general stereotype (Devine & Baker, 1991; 
Richards & Hewstone, 2001). The main noun refers to a 
superordinate category, but is modified by an adjective or 
another noun. Such labels reflect nested representations 
(Rothbart & Park, 2004). Subtype references are, for in-
stance, expected in references to females and males who 
function in roles or occupations that are inconsistent with 
gender stereotypes. In these cases, people tend to add an 
explicit mention of the person’s sex (e.g., female surgeon, 
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crease their focus on label-congruent information (Ruscher, 
1998). Particularly when information is already part of the 
common ground (i.e., shared cognition) between communi-
cation partners, communication of stereotype-congruent 
knowledge becomes likelier (Fast, Heath, & Wu, 2009; Lyons 
& Kashima, 2001, 2003; Wittenbaum & Park, 2001). 
In addition to interpersonal communication, mass media 
are a powerful transmitter of stereotypic characteristics as-
sociated with categories (Arendt, 2013; Ramasubramanian, 
2011; Ramasubramanian & Oliver, 2007). For instance, tele-
vision announcers covering professional football and basket-
ball have been shown to subtly induce associations by more 
frequently emphasizing athleticism of African-American 
players, while emphasizing intellectual abilities and charac-
ter traits of White players (Billings, 2004; Eastman & Bill-
ings, 2001; Rada, 1996; Rada & Wulfemeyer, 2005). These 
and other types of biased representations in media content 
of different categories have an effect on recipients. For in-
stance, Arendt and Northup (2015) found that increased 
exposure to local television news, in which African Ameri-
cans are overrepresented as criminals, is related to more 
negative implicit and explicit attitudes about African Amer-
icans. Likewise, negative news portrayals of immigrants 
have been shown to increase negative stereotypic attitudes 
in an audience, while exposure to positive news reduced the 
activation of negative attitudes about immigrants (Schemer, 
2012). 
The consequence of this bias in communication content 
is that members of (sub)cultures will be exposed relatively 
more to congruent information of shared stereotypes, which 
leads to a continuous confirmation of existing stereotypic 
associations. Frequent exposure to a category label in com-
bination with certain characteristics strengthens these as-
sociations. These strenghtened associations, in turn, 
increases accessibility and likelihood of the link being acti-
vated and shared again in subsequent communications. By 
repeatedly retelling a certain category-trait association, it 
can thus become a widely shared, cultural belief amongst 
members of a subculture (Bratanova & Kashima, 2014). 
Hence, the stereotype consistency bias shows that commu-
nications about characteristics and behavior reflects and 
shapes stereotype content and possibly also perceived es-
sentialism (Figure 1, dashed arrows 5). 
Like label use, the communication of stereotype congru-
ent information is shaped by factors in the communicative 
context. One explanation put forward for the tendency to 
(e.g., derogatory labels, slurs, ethnophaulisms) are in many 
contexts regarded as offensive and socially unacceptable, 
and this will induce people to refrain from using them (Cran-
dall et al., 2002; Croom, 2013; Fasoli et al., 2015). Social 
norms may also affect the use of labels of different linguistic 
form. For instance, particularly with negatively stereotyped 
categories, the use of strong noun labels may be perceived as 
inappropriate, because this fixates the individual as a typical 
instance of the social category (Mullen 2001). Within cul-
tural groups, social norms, thus, determine what labels to 
use. This too contributes to the consensualization of social 
category cognition, because it induces people to communi-
cate and internalize the social category cognition that is 
consensually shared.
(2) Biases in describing behaviors and characteristics 
of categorized individuals.
Once a category is perceived (and labeled) as a meaning-
ful entity, perceivers can acquire, and subsequently main-
tain, a set of stereotypic characteristics that are held to be 
– to a varying extent – essential to the category as a whole. 
Two types of biases in communications about categorized 
individuals play a crucial role in the process of stereotype 
formation and maintenance: (a) biases in communication 
content (what we communicate about), and (b) biases in lin-
guistic form (how information about categorized individuals 
is formulated).
(a) Biases in communication content.
What information about categorized individuals is com-
municated. One way through which a labeled category ac-
quires and keeps its stereotypic associations is determined 
by what information is shared in communication about cat-
egory members. The information that is shared may deter-
mine stereotype content if there is a general tendency for 
people to systematically communicate more about certain 
features and characteristics categories relative to others 
(Schaller, Conway, & Tanchuk, 2002). Numerous studies on 
serial reproduction and dyadic conversation have revealed a 
stereotype-consistency bias, showing that stereotype-consis-
tent information tends to be shared more prominently com-
pared to stereotype-inconsistent information in conversations 
about categorized individuals (Klein et al., 2008; Kashima, 
2000; Ruscher, 1998; Schaller et al., 2002). Once target in-
dividuals are labeled as a member of a category (e.g., by 
using a label like “an alcoholic”), conversation dyads in-
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Another moderator of the stereotype-consistency bias 
relates to the social acceptability of verbally expressing cer-
tain stereotypic views (Ruscher et al., 2005). As discussed 
above, social norms often dictate that it is socially unaccept-
able to express prejudiced stereotypic beliefs about social 
categories to which the speaker does not belong (e.g., Cran-
dall et al., 2002; Croom, 2013). In such cases, an interaction 
may develop towards increased sharing of counter-stereo-
typic attributes, in order to convey non-prejudiced impres-
sions. 
One should realize, however, that sharing stereotype-
inconsistent information is not necessarily always stereotype 
disconfirming. First, attempts to plea in favor of a nega-
tively stereotyped group may increase category entitativity, 
because the group is explicitly labeled (see above). Second, 
subtle variations in linguistic form in communications about 
stereotype-inconsistent (compared to consistent) information 
may adversely have stereotype confirming effects (see next 
section).
Section summary. 
In sum, research shows that more time is allocated to 
communicating stereotype-consistent information compared 
to stereotype-inconsistent information. This facilitates the 
formation and maintenance of a set of (more or less) immu-
table stereotypic associations with (labeled) categories (ste-
reotype content and perceived category essentialism). This 
bias likely has the strongest inductive effect on stereotype 
formation when category entitativity is high; i.e., when the 
discussed category is labeled with a noun, and particularly 
with a generic noun and sentence, as explained in the previ-
ous sections. Repeated exposure to a category label along 
with certain characteristics creates or reinforces cognitive 
linkages between the category and characteristics (stereotype 
content), and these characteristics may also increasingly be 
perceived as essential for the category. When such linkages 
exist, it, in turn, becomes more likely that the characteristics 
are introduced again in communications about relevant 
categorized persons. 
Nevertheless, stereotype-inconsistent information is – 
although less frequently – mentioned in communication. 
Without considering how stereotype-inconsistent informa-
tion is introduced in communications, one might simply 
assume that stereotype-inconsistent information is always 
stereotype disconfirming. The next section about how ste-
reotype information is introduced in communications and 
predominantly communicate existing stereotype-consistent 
information, in addition to its increased accessibility, is that 
it is relationally beneficial. People prefer to communicate 
information they believe resonates with their audiences be-
cause it allows them to develop common ground and it fa-
cilitates perceptions of similarity, liking, and agreeableness 
(Bratanova & Kashima, 2014, Clark & Kashima, 2007; Hig-
gins, 1992). Also, conveying shared stereotype-consistent 
(vs. inconsistent) information to a conversation partner 
likely allows for a smooth interaction; it usually requires 
fewer processing resources (in communication time, number 
and length of utterances), because conversation partners can 
easily reconcile this information with existing assumptions, 
and it less likely leads to misunderstanding or disagreement 
(Klein et al., 2008). 
The stereotype-consistency bias can thus follow from a 
motivation to reach consensus and agreement with a con-
versation partner (Ruscher, 1998). When these social goals 
prevail, the message constructed for an audience need not 
even reflect communicators’ own beliefs about a social tar-
get. Transmitting a stereotypic target-group description to a 
recipient who is likely to endorse it may follow from com-
municators’ proclivity to form or affirm a social relationship 
and to show in-group solidarity (Bratanova & Kashima, 
2014; Clark & Kashima, 2007; Ruscher, Cralley, & O’Farrell, 
2005).
The communicative context may also induce factors that 
prevent or even reverse the stereotype-consistency bias. In 
some contexts, stereotype-inconsistent information becomes 
more relevant and therefore features in communications. For 
instance, when a sender is motivated to inform an audience 
(rather than to create and maintain a social relationship), 
stereotype-inconsistent information is considered more use-
ful (Clark & Kashima, 2007). Likewise, when speakers are 
motivated to develop an accurate individuated representation 
of a target, they tend to devote more communication time to 
stereotype-inconsistent information (Ruscher, Hammer, & 
Hammer, 1996; Karasawa, Asai, & Tanabe, 2007). Sharing 
of stereotype-inconsistent information also increases among 
groups of communicators who each have unique target in-
formation, as this increases their sense of accountability and 
desire to be accurate and complete (Brauer, Judd, & Jacque-
lin, 2001; Ruscher & Duval, 1998). These factors thus induce 
a motivation towards lower and individuated levels of infor-
mation that mimics the narrowing process described above 
(cf. Fiske & Neuberg, 1990).
Camiel J. Beukeboom & Christian Burgers
20 www.rcommunicationr.org
corresponds to generalizations on the behavior description 
dimension (Beike & Sherman, 1994), as more abstract terms 
generalize across situations (high-level information) while 
concrete terms describe specified situational behaviors (low-
level information). Recipients are sensitive to these subtle 
variations and infer higher essentialism from abstract com-
pared to concrete descriptions. Higher levels of language 
abstraction thus both follow from, and induce, perceptions 
that the described behaviors are essential for the categorized 
actor and are stable across situations (Wigboldus et al., 
2000). 
The Stereotypic Explanatory Bias (SEB) relates to a com-
parable linguistic variation, and proposes that speakers (and 
conversing dyads, Hammer & Ruscher, 1997) tend to pro-
duce more explanatory comments for stereotype-inconsistent 
(vs. consistent) behaviors (e.g., the man is crying, because he 
has a rough day; Hastie, 1984; Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; 
Sekaquaptewa, Espinoza, Thompson, Vargas, & von Hippel, 
2003). Such explanations of stereotype-inconsistent behavior 
are aimed at clarifying the apparent inconsistency, which is 
not needed for stereotype-consistent behavior. Inconsisten-
cies are surprising, and in order to maintain coherence in 
one’s existing stereotypic impression, a perceiver strives to 
resolve inconsistencies and attempt to explain why the in-
consistency occurred (see also Hegarty & Pratto, 2001, study 
3). Both concrete situational descriptions and explanations 
are linguistic reflections of such attempts.
When communicating about stereotype-inconsistent in-
formation, speakers can also introduce stereotype-consistent 
terms, for instance by using negations or irony. Research on 
the Negation Bias (NB; Beukeboom et al., 2010) revealed 
that the use of syntactic negations (e.g., not stupid, rather than 
smart) is more pronounced in descriptions of stereotype-in-
consistent compared to stereotype-consistent behaviors. For 
example, if a sender’s stereotypic expectancy dictates that 
garbage men are stupid, but a particular garbage man vio-
lates this expectancy by showing highly intelligent behavior, 
the sender is likely to reveal his prior expectancy by using a 
negation like The garbage man was not stupid. In contrast, for 
stereotype-consistent behavior (e.g., The garbage man was 
stupid; The professor was smart), the use of negations is less 
likely. Negations thus allow one to introduce stereotype 
consistent concepts in communications about stereotype-
inconsistent information, and thereby re-affirm existing 
associations with a category.
A similar mechanism has been shown to occur in the 
its relation to stereotype content and perceived essentialism 
will argue that this assumption is not warranted.
(b) Biases in linguistic form of  communications about 
categorized individuals. 
A second way through which a labeled category acquires 
and keeps a set of associated essential stereotypic character-
istics is determined by how information about categorized 
individuals formulated. When people communicate about 
categorized individuals, their formulations refer in various 
ways to what is expected for the categorized individual or 
applied category as a whole. Research within this field shows 
that information about people that is consistent with existing 
social-category cognition is formulated differently than in-
formation that is inconsistent with social-category cognition 
(Beukeboom, 2014). Several subtle variations in verbal for-
mulation have been shown to subtly communicate what is 
expected (i.e., part of the stereotype content and essential) 
rather than unexpected for a categorized target. 
The most investigated linguistic means to communicate 
the extent to which behavior is expected or not is language 
abstraction as defined by the Linguistic Category Model 
(Semin & Fiedler, 1988). Any behavior can be described in 
concrete terms, using action verbs (e.g., she kicks him) or 
using increasingly more abstract terms like state verbs (e.g., 
she hates him) or adjectives (e.g., she is aggressive). Research 
on the Linguistic Intergroup Bias (LIB; Maass, Milesi, Zab-
bini, & Stahlberg 1995; Maass, 1999) and Linguistic Expec-
tancy Bias (LEB; Wigboldus et al., 2000) shows that language 
abstraction varies as a function of stereotype consistency. A 
target’s behavior is likelier described in abstract terms when 
it is stereotype-consistent and the fit between the described 
behavior and existing stereotypic expectancies is high (e.g., 
adjectives; the woman is emotional), but more concretely 
when it is stereotype-inconsistent and fit is low (e.g., descrip-
tive action verbs; the man is crying). 
Given that abstract descriptions provide more informa-
tion about the actor’s stable dispositional qualities and less 
information about the specific situation (Semin & Fiedler, 
1988), higher levels of abstraction endorse existing stereo-
typic beliefs. That is, abstract words used for stereotype-
consistent behaviors imply attribution to stable traits that are 
present across situation (i.e., high essentialism), whereas 
concrete words used for stereotype-inconsistent behaviors 
imply attribution to transient situational causes, suggesting 
rule exceptions (Wigboldus & Douglas, 2007). Note that this 
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expected. It has been argued, based on studies using catego-
rizations of toys and colors, that speakers convey confidence 
cues (e.g., hedges and hesitations; I guess, I don’t know) 
when they are uncertain about a categorization, and that 
recipients use these cues to draw inferences about category 
structure (Barr & Kronmüller, 2006). 
Another possible linguistic means for bias relates to work 
by Haviland and Clark (1974). They argued that, in order to 
maintain common ground and understanding, communica-
tion partners adhere to a given-new contract, which dictates 
a conversation norm to indicate what is given information, 
and what is new information. Given information may be 
something that is shared before, but also general knowledge 
that is considered known. This includes social-category ste-
reotypes that are shared between communication partners. 
‘New’ information is not yet shared and thus requires a 
modification in the shape of the listener’s current knowledge 
(MacWhinney & Bates, 1978). When information is assumed 
to be given, it is either omitted or referenced briefly or in 
general terms. When information is new, in contrast, it is 
likelier to be marked (Clark & Haviland, 1977). Note, that 
– if we consider stereotype-inconsistent information as new 
information – the above-described biases fit with this reason-
ing; i.e., when stereotype-inconsistent information is intro-
duced it tends to be marked by using concrete terms (LEB), 
by adding explanations (SEB), the use of negations or irony 
(NB, IB), and potentially by using signal words, hedges, and 
hesitations.
Interestingly, research has also shown a given-new order-
ing (Ferreira & Yoshita, 2003; MacWhinney & Bates, 1978) 
in that speakers tend to produce sentences in which given 
information is mentioned first, and new information later. 
Future research may shed more light on the extent to which 
these –and other– linguistic variations are used to indicate 
stereotypic exceptions and induce difference in essentialist 
inferences about social categories. 
Section summary and integration. 
In sum, research shows that biases in the content and the 
linguistic form of descriptions of the behaviors and charac-
teristics of categorized individuals reflect and maintain exist-
ing social-category cognition, specifically with respect to 
stereotype content and perceived category essentialism 
(Figure 1, dashed arrows 5). Biases in communication 
content show a tendency to mainly communicate about be-
haviors and characteristics that are in line with existing 
Irony Bias (IB, Burgers & Beukeboom, 2016). Research on 
the IB shows that speakers find ironic remarks particularly 
appropriate to comment on stereotype-violating (vs. stereo-
type-confirming) behaviors. An ironic remark about stereo-
type-inconsistent behavior (e.g., “what a neat person” about 
someone’s messy room) allows speakers to introduce the 
expectancy (the person is expected to be neat) and simultane-
ously signal its failure. The literal meaning of ironic com-
ments is inappropriate for the context, and thereby 
(ironically) refers to some relevant information, like im-
plicit (stereotypic) expectancies (e.g., Attardo, 2000; Utsumi, 
2000; Wilson & Sperber, 2004). Like negations, ironic re-
marks introduce opposite terms to describe a behavioral 
situation. This led some scholars to consider irony as a form 
of “indirect negation” (Giora, 1995). Both negations and 
ironic comments about stereotype-inconsistent behavior can 
thus activate and communicate the implicit stereotypic ex-
pectancy in message recipients. Moreover, recipients infer 
lower essentialism from both negated behavior descriptions 
(compared to affirmation; Beukeboom et al., 2010) and from 
ironic (compared to literal) comments (Burgers & Beuke-
boom, 2016), showing that these biases serve to maintain 
expectancies about what is and what is not essential for 
members of a given social category.
Interestingly, various studies suggest that these biases, 
particularly the SEB (Hamilton & Sherman, 1996), LEB 
(Spencer-Rodgers, Hamilton, & Sherman, 2007), and LIB 
(Moscatelli & Rubini, 2011; Rubini, Moscatelli, & Palmo-
nari, 2007) are stronger when the described target category 
is high (vs. low) in perceived entitativity. The higher per-
ceived entitativity and expected consistency, the more trou-
bled perceivers will be by perceived stereotype inconsistent 
behaviors, and this increases perceivers efforts to resolve 
these (Hamilton & Sherman, 1996). The strenghtened efforts 
to resolve such inconsistencies, in turn, are revealed in biased 
language use. 
Finally, there are undoubtedly other linguistic means that 
allow one to indicate whether described behaviors of cate-
gory member(s) are expected or not, but that have hitherto 
not been studied with respect to stereotypes. First, any lan-
guage contains an abundance of potential signal words to 
indicate that behavior is typical (e.g., as always; indeed; 
again) or rather that it is an unexpected one-time-event (e.g., 
this time; once; unexpectedly). It seems plausible that speak-
ers use such signal words to indicate whether or not a target’s 
discussed characteristics and behavior are stereotypically 
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cognition is reflected in, and shaped by), biases in language 
use in communications about categorized individuals (Fig. 
1, arrow A and B, while acknowledging that language use 
about categorized individuals is shaped by (2) a perceived 
reality (i.e., target’s situations, features and behavior; Fig. 1, 
arrow C), and (3) by processes in the communication context 
which, simultaneously, play a role in the consensualization 
process. In the following, we first summarize these three 
aspects of the SCSC framework, and then continue with 
discussing its theoretical contributions and future directions. 
First, the SCSC framework poses that perceived category 
entitativity, stereotype content, and essentialism are reflect-
ed in, and shaped by, biases in language use in communica-
tions about categorized individuals (Fig. 1 arrow A and B). 
We distinguish two linguistic bias types, each of which is 
further specified by focusing on linguistic content and form. 
The first type of biases concerns the use of category labels. 
Research shows that once a category of individuals is lin-
guistically labeled, it is perceived as a unified and coherent 
entity that is distinguishable from other categories within a 
social-category taxonomy. The content of the label (i.e., 
meaning of label term) is important because it conveys the 
category’s position in this taxonomy (i.e., broad, superordi-
nate vs. more narrow, subordinate) and may prime or com-
plement the set of stereotypic characteristics that is 
associated with the category (stereotype content and essen-
tialism; Fig. 1, arrows 4).
Like label content, the linguistic form of category labels 
relates in predictable ways to perceived category entitativity, 
stereotype content, and essentialism. That is, noun labels (as 
compared to adjective or descriptive labels) function to de-
note within-group similarities, and distinctions between 
categories and thereby imply a relatively high perceived 
category entitativity. Moreover, noun labels activate the 
stereotype content that is associated with the labeled cate-
gory, and imply a higher perceived immutability of associ-
ated characteristics (perceived essentialism). Noun labels in 
generic form (i.e., generics) generalize across individual 
category members, and imply the strongest category essen-
tialism and entitativity. In contrast, weaker labels, like adjec-
tives, compound subtype labels, or descriptive phrases, imply 
lower category entitativity and essentialism and are likelier 
used when referring to stereotype-violating targets that are 
hard to categorize. 
The second types of biases that have been studied concern 
the use of language in communications about behaviors and 
social-category stereotypes. This stereotype consistency bias 
reflects and strengthens associations between the target 
category and the content of the set of stereotypic character-
istics (i.e., stereotype content); the repetition may increase 
perceptions that these associated characteristics are immu-
table and stable across situations (i.e., essentialism). Biases 
in linguistic form show variations as a function of whether 
described behaviors are consistent with existing social-cat-
egory cognition or not, and also relate to perceived essential-
ism. When a described target’s behavior is stereotype 
inconsistent (low fit; compared to consistent) it is likelier 
described in concrete terms, to contain situational explana-
tions (cf. low-level information), and by means of negations 
and ironic remarks. Both negations and irony allow speakers 
to introduce stereotype consistent terms in descriptions 
about stereotype-inconsistent information and thereby con-
firm existing stereotypic associations. This means that even 
when people are confronted with stereotype-inconsistent 
information, a biased formulation may induce recipients to 
draw stereotype-confirming inferences, both with respect to 
stereotype content and perceived immutability of associated 
traits. That is, the formulations that are used to communicate 
stereotype-inconsistent information (compared to consistent) 
imply lower levels of essentialism (Beukeboom, 2014). Again, 
these processes function to consensualize social category 
stereotypes.
General Discussion: Contributions, 
Implications, and Future Directions
Although social-category stereotypes have mostly been 
defined and studied as an intrapersonal phenomenon, they 
are nevertheless generally assumed to become consensually 
shared within (sub)cultures (Haslam et al., 1997; Holtgraves 
& Kashima, 2007). Our integrative literature review attempts 
to elucidate the mechanisms through which stereotype con-
sensuality is achieved by specifically focusing on the role of 
language use. The SCSC framework integrates knowledge 
about various linguistic means that hitherto existed in large-
ly independent fields, and links these to three fundamental 
variables in (shared) social-category cognition: perceived 
category entitativity, stereotype content, and essentialism. 
The framework consists of three interrelated parts that to-
gether explain the consensualization of social category cog-
nition. Based on our review, we pose that (1) social category 
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these combine a generic label with an abstract behavior de-
scription and thus generalize both across individual catego-
ry members and across situations (e.g., boys are tough; 
immigrants are violent). Generics have been shown to quite 
directly induce perceptions of category entitativity and as-
sociations between labeled categories and essential charac-
teristics (e.g., Gelman et al., 2010); when a generic utterance 
is accepted by a recipient, no further inductive inferences are 
required for stereotype formation. In contrast, when a dis-
cussed target’s fit to an activated category is low (i.e., a-
typical individuals showing stereotype inconsistent 
behaviors), one may either seek an alternative more fitting 
category, or communicate the information at a low level (cf. 
Beike & Sherman, 1994). In the latter case, one thus tends 
to narrow to the use of more specified labels (individuals, 
subtypes), and concrete, situational behavior descriptions. 
As low-level formulations induce lower levels of category 
essentialism for the described behavior the result of this is 
that a-typical behaviors and characteristics are not essential-
ized.
Third, while the above processes are usually argued to 
result from intrapersonal processes (i.e., perceived inconsis-
tencies between activated cognition and a perceived target), 
the SCSC framework acknowledges that language use about 
categorized individuals is shaped by interpersonal processes 
in the communication context. In line with others, we have 
argued that the consensualization of stereotypes is most 
likely within subcultures, or specifically, among groups of 
people who define themselves in terms of a shared social 
identity (Carnaghi & Yzerbyt, 2007; Crandall et al., 2002; 
Haslam et al., 1997; Haslam et al., 1996; Haslam, Oakes, 
Reynolds, & Turner, 1999). 
On the one hand, this occurs because people are more 
likely to express social information (in content and form) in 
line with consensually shared social category stereotypes. 
That is, people tailor their descriptions to assumed stereo-
typic views of recipients (Carnaghi & Yzerbyt, 2007; Higgins 
& Rholes, 1978; McCann & Higgins, 1990; Marsh, 2007). 
Also, people are sensitive to social norms about expressing 
stereotypic impressions and will, for instance, refrain from 
expressing negative prejudice (e.g., using derogatory labels) 
when this is perceived as socially unacceptable (Croom, 
2013; Fasoli et al., 2015; Crandall et al., 2002). Moreover, the 
tendency to pursue common ground in communication 
causes people to more prominently label known and acces-
sible categories and discuss stereotype-consistent (compared 
characteristics of categorized individuals. In terms of com-
munication content (i.e., what information about categorized 
individuals is communicated), research shows a stereotype-
consistency bias. People tend to prefer sharing information 
that is already part of the stereotype content associated with 
(labeled) categories. In terms of linguistic form, several bi-
ases (e.g., in language abstraction, explanations, negations, 
irony) show subtle differences in formulating stereotype-
violating compared to stereotype-confirming information 
about categorized individuals. Stereotype confirming behav-
iors tend to be communicated using more abstract descrip-
tions (e.g., X is aggressive; Y is helpful) that generalize across 
situations, and thereby convey high levels of perceived es-
sentialism of the described characteristic. In contrast, ste-
reotype-violating behaviors of an activated category tend to 
be communicated with concrete verbs that link to specified 
situations (LEB), by providing situated explanations (SEB), 
or using negations (NB) or irony (IB) that introduce stereo-
type consistent terms. Such formulations have been shown 
to imply that the described behavior is a one-time exception 
to the rule and thus induce lower levels of perceived essential-
ism. Together, these biases reflect and thereby maintain both 
the content of existing stereotypes as well as the perceived 
level of immutability of these associated stereotypic charac-
teristics (i.e., perceived essentialism; Fig. 1, dashed arrows 
5). 
Second, the SCSC framework acknowledges that lan-
guage use about categorized individuals is shaped by a per-
ceived reality (i.e., the target’s situation; Fig 1, arrow C). 
That is, communication about categorized individuals like-
ly starts with input about the target’s observable features and 
actual behavioral situations. However, texts or conversations 
may further evolve to higher levels of information (i.e., using 
generic labels that generalize across individuals, and abstract 
behavior descriptions that generalize across situations) that 
have no direct reference to actual people behaving in spe-
cific situations. As a consequence, communication about 
social category stereotypes may acquire a “life of their own” 
with little or no basis in reality (Brauer, Judd, & Thompson, 
2004). 
As noted above, from our analysis we conclude that com-
munication at a high generalized level (cf. Beike & Sherman, 
1994) is most likely when a discussed target’s features and 
behaviors fit with existing social category cognition (i.e., 
typical members showing stereotype-consistent behaviors). 
Generic sentences convey the highest level of information as 
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tences in isolation, our integrative framework provides a 
crucial contribution; it allows for a better understanding of 
stereotype-maintaining biases in natural language in which 
various biases occur in combination, and opens up various 
opportunities for further research focusing on natural lan-
guage. A number of research areas can profit from our inte-
grative focus on language use.
The most immediate field our integrative framework can 
inform is research on linguistic bias. In natural language, 
various linguistic biases can be combined in ways that are 
usually ignored in experimental studies. Biases in labeling 
and in behavior descriptions can co-occur, but it seems pos-
sible that the use of one bias might also compensate for the 
other (Fig. 1, arrow 2). For instance, when a person catego-
rized as Muslim shows behavioral inconsistencies with the 
associated stereotype for Muslims (fit is low, e.g., having 
lunch during Ramadan), this could result in the use of a 
weaker adjective label (a Muslim person) or subtype label (a 
non-practicing Muslim) rather than a noun label (He is a 
Muslim; cf. Carnaghi et al., 2008). When, however, a target 
has already been labeled with a noun (i.e., a Muslim), the 
use of biases in behavior descriptions might increase; e.g., 
speakers might be more inclined to use negations in describ-
ing his behavior (e.g., He does not practice Ramadan; cf., 
negation bias; Beukeboom et al. 2010) or to make ironic re-
marks (e.g., Well, well, he sure is a dogmatic Muslim; Burg-
ers & Beukeboom, 2016), in order to reconcile the 
inconsistency while confirming the stereotypic associations 
that are activated through the used category label. This fits 
with the notion that higher entitativity (implied by the noun 
label) induces stronger biases in behavior descriptions (e.g., 
Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; Moscatelli & Rubini, 2011; 
Rubini et al., 2007; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2007). Future 
research may shed light on combinations between labeling 
and biases in behavior descriptions, and on how various 
linguistic biases in behavior descriptions (e.g., language 
abstraction, explanations, negations) interact.
The second related field that may profit from our integra-
tive review is research on stereotype formation and use. 
Perceived category entitativity and essentialism are gener-
ally considered to play a crucial role in the formation (induc-
tion) and use (stereotyping) of social-category stereotypes 
(Abelson et al., 1998; Crawford et al., 2002; Hamilton & 
Sherman, 1996; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2007; Yzerbyt et al., 
2001), but research in this area suffers from a lack of consen-
sus (e.g., Hamilton, 2007) and has focused relatively little on 
to inconsistent) characteristics and behaviors (Fast et al., 
2009; Fiedler, Bluemke, Friese, & Hofmann, 2003; Klein, 
Clark, & Lyons, 2010; Lyons & Kashima, 2001, 2003; Wit-
tenbaum & Park, 2001). 
On the other hand, perceived consensus is used to vali-
date the social information people receive or discuss, and 
thereby determines whether people internalize the informa-
tion as part of their social-category cognition. When people 
learn that their pre-existing stereotypic beliefs are consensu-
ally shared by in-group members (but not by out-group mem-
bers), these stereotypes are bolstered (Haslam et al., 1997; 
Haslam et al., 1996; Wittenbrink & Henly, 1996), and in-
crease in accessibility (Sechrist & Stangor, 2001). Moreover, 
sharing and discussing social information allows people to 
monitor and verify whether their category cognition is cor-
rect, and agreement and confirmation can provide greater 
certainty (Klein et al., 2008; Kashima, Klein, & Clark, 2007; 
Kopietz, Hellmann, Higgins, & Echterhoff, 2010; Echterhoff, 
Higgins, & Levine, 2009. Research by Kashima et al. (2010), 
for instance, showed that the mere act of communicating 
about characteristics of a novel social category induced 
stronger dispositional attributions, and stronger beliefs about 
the immutable essence of the category (i.e., increased per-
ceived essentialism). Importantly, this induction occured 
especially when the speakers’ descriptions were socially 
validated by the conversation partner (i.e., grounded; con-
versation partners mutually recognized that they had 
reached an understanding about a target person; H. Clark, 
1996; Echterhoff, Higgins, & Groll, 2005). 
Together, the above processes explain how members of 
(sub)cultures create a shared social reality (cf. Kashima, 
2004; Thompson & Fine, 1999) about which social categories 
are considered meaningful (i.e., perceived category entitativ-
ity) and their associated stereotypes (i.e., specified in stereo-
type content and perceived essentialism). We now turn to 
the contributions and future research of the SCSC frame-
work for theory on stereotypes and intergroup dynamics. 
Contributions: The Role of Language Use 
in the Consensualization of Social-Category 
Stereotypes 
An important contribution of the SCSC framework lies 
in the integration of knowledge about various linguistic-bias 
types. As much research has been conducted in experimen-
tal settings, often relying on manipulations of artificial sen-
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in which people communicate about social categories and 
their members. A well-known finding in this area, known 
as the out-group homogeneity effect (Ostrom & Sedikides, 
1992), is that people tend to develop a more fine-grained and 
differentiated social category structure about their in-group, 
containing varying subordinate categories, compared to out-
groups which tend to be more overgeneralized. While a 
number of cognitive explanations have been shown to un-
derlie these differences (Park, Ryan & Judd, 1992; Ryan & 
Bogart, 1997), the SCSC framework explains how these are 
(simultaneously) driven by the ways people communicate 
about these categories. Category perceptions are reflected in 
language use, and will be confirmed and internalized as a 
result of that. 
This notion is illustrated in a study by Harasty (1997) 
who studied language use in same-sex dyadic conversations 
about in- and out-groups (i.e., pairs of women or men talking 
about women and men). From the 5 minute conversation 
transcripts, the authors coded levels of generalization in la-
beling (i.e., self-reference, individual category member (e.g., 
my mom), subcategory (e.g., sorority women), generic cate-
gory references (e.g., women), and two (albeit rather rough) 
levels of abstraction in behavior descriptions (i.e., non-traits; 
behavior or state like “wearing makeup” vs. traits like “as-
sertive”). Results showed that discussions about out-groups 
contained higher levels of generalization. That is, out-group 
discussions included more generic labels (i.e., generalizing 
across individuals), and more abstract trait descriptions (i.e., 
generalizing across situations) than discussions about in-
groups. Moreover, generic descriptions of the out-group were 
more likely negative than positive in valence. This demon-
strates how out-group homogeneity and in-group favoritism 
are expressed and thereby maintained through communica-
tion.
Likewise, communication and language use can explain 
how perceptions of minority groups emerge. Research shows 
that stereotypes of minority groups are better known, more 
accessible, and perhaps even more automatized than are 
stereotypes of normative majority groups (Brewer, Weber, 
& Carini, 1995; Brewer & Harasty, 1996; McGarty et al., 
1995)
This finding can be explained from studies that revealed 
a bias of focus in communications wherein several social 
categories are discussed simultaneously or compared to each 
other (Hegarty & Pratto, 2001; Miller, Taylor, & Buck, 1991). 
Building on Norm Theory (Kahneman & Miller, 1986), this 
language use. The SCSC framework highlights the crucial 
role of language use in the formation and maintenance of 
stereotypes by explaining how category entitativity, stereo-
type content, and perceived essentialism are shaped by, and 
reflected in, language use. This approach fits with the view 
that social category stereotypes are, rather than merely in-
trapersonal phenomena, collectively created within subcul-
tures, and formed and maintained by means of language use 
in socially situated interactions (Crandall et al., 2002; Semin, 
2008). While categories and their associated stereotypes may 
be acquired from observation of features and behaviors of 
category members, these factors likely co-occur with lan-
guage use when people communicate about them. Moreover, 
generic stereotypic knowledge as such is not observable, and 
can only be communicated through language. Hence, theo-
ry about stereotype formation and use is incomplete without 
considering the role of language use.
We have argued that once an aggregate of individuals is 
labeled using a (generic) noun label, it is likelier perceived as 
a meaningful, coherent group (i.e., high entitativity). An 
increase in category entitativity will be reflected in more 
frequent labeling. This, in turn, induces perceivers to cease 
viewing category members as individuals and generalize 
associated characteristics across individuals (Crawford et al., 
2002), thereby facilitating the formation of a generalized 
stereotypic impression, consisting of a set of associated char-
acteristics, that are perceived as more or less essential to its 
members. Language use thus reflects, shapes and maintains 
the category taxonomy that prevails within a (sub)culture 
(i.e., which categories are perceived as meaningful entities 
and become essentialized). In general, people will most 
likely discuss and apply conventional category labels and 
consequently continuously confirm and maintain the exist-
ing category taxonomy of chronically salient categories and 
associated stereotypes within their (sub)culture. However, 
new categories may evolve. For instance, people living be-
tween 140 and 150 degrees east longitude (see Kashima, 
2004) or brown-eyed vs. blue-eyed people (Elliott, 1984) 
would conventionally not be considered as meaningful cat-
egories. When, however, such an aggregate is labeled and 
discussed in media and interpersonal conversation (e.g., 
hipsters) it will suddenly be perceived as an entitative cate-
gory, acquire associations with a set of essentialist charac-
teristics, and may become the target of prejudice and 
discrimination.
Social category perceptions thus emerge from the ways 
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identification. Likewise, increased use of such strong labels 
in self-descriptions (as compared to weaker labels like adjec-
tives or descriptive phrases) likely reveals a relatively strong 
in-group identification. 
In a broader intergroup perspective, people’s social iden-
tity also affects how they communicate about in- and out-
group members. Social category memberships are an 
inherent aspect of people’s identity, and people strive to 
maintain and enhance a positive social identity (Turner et 
al., 1987). Several studies show how motivational factors and 
communication goals that may arise from a speaker’s social 
identity can induce biased language use in the types of com-
ments speakers make about behaviors by in- and out-group 
members. 
Research on the Linguistic Intergroup Bias (LIB), for 
instance, demonstrated that the use of predicates of different 
abstraction referring to positive and negative behaviors of 
in- and out-group members is driven by a motivation to 
protect one’s social identity (Maass et al., 1995; Maass, Ce-
ccarelli, & Rudin, 1996; Wigboldus & Douglas, 2007). It was 
demonstrated that the LIB was more pronounced in inter-
group settings wherein the in-group was threatened (e.g., 
hostility between Northern and Southern Italians). This 
motivational effect that results from a speaker’s group mem-
berships, was shown to be independent of the expectancy 
mechanism by which implicit cognitive associations and 
expectancies are reflected in language abstraction; i.e., ex-
pectancy consistent behaviors based on stereotypes about 
Northern and Southern Italians are described at a higher 
level of abstraction than expectancy inconsistent behavior 
(Maass et al., 1995; Maas et al., 1996). Douglas and Sutton 
(2003) showed that such motivational communication goals 
can have a strong effect on the use of language abstraction 
(e.g., adopting abstract predicates to describe positive behav-
iors and concrete predicates to describe negative behaviors 
to favorably portray a person or group) that can override the 
cognitive expectancy mechanism (i.e., LEB). On the recipi-
ent side, research shows that speakers who exhibit in-group-
serving linguistic abstraction biases in their communications 
about others are more appreciated as good group members 
than speakers whose communication deviates from such 
linguistic biases (Assilaméhou & Testé, 2013). 
It seems plausible that similar motivational processes play 
a role in other linguistic bias types as well. Burgers, Beuke-
boom, Kelder, & Peeters (2015), for instance, showed how 
soccer fans can employ ironic remarks to enhance group 
work shows that explanations of inter-category differences 
typically focus on the atypical category (e.g., a minority 
within the relevant domain), which is subsequently com-
pared to the norm category (e.g., a majority). Explanations 
of differences between gay and straight men, for instance, 
typically take gay men as the subject, particularly in a con-
text in which straight men are considered the normative 
majority group (Hegarty & Pratto, 2001). The same occurs 
in explanations of gender differences; i.e., when explaining 
a gender gap in illness rates for college professors (expected 
to be typically male) or elementary school teachers (ex-
pected to be typically female), participants focused their 
explanations on the atypical category (e.g., female professors 
are ...; Miller et al., 1991; see also Bruckmüller, Hegarty, & 
Abele, 2012; Hegarty & Buechel, 2006). Such an increased 
relative focus in category comparisons may be reflected in 
language as a combination of a) placing the atypical catego-
ry in sentence subject position, b) mentioning it first in a 
comparison with a referent (e.g., Bruckmüller & Abele, 
2010), or c) simply in more frequent use of the minority (vs. 
majority) category label. 
The SCSC framework predicts that such an increased 
focus on minority categories, along with other bias types, 
will both increase perceived entitativity and essentialism of 
minority categories. The minority category is more promi-
nently labeled and, because stereotypic and essential features 
of this category are put forward as explanations for the in-
tergroup differences (Hegarty & Pratto, 2001), more strong-
ly essentialized. The resulting higher entitativity and 
essentialism may further increase the accessibility of the 
stereotype and likelihood that it is applied to judge and dis-
cuss individual category members. 
Another relevant field that can profit from a focus on 
language use is research in the tradition of Social Identity 
Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and Self-Categorization 
Theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987; 
Hogg & Reid, 2006). Language use not only shapes and re-
flects the categorization of others, but also people’s self-
categorizations, social identity, and the in-groups they 
identify with. Interestingly, research shows that higher per-
ceived category entitativity facilitates in-group identification 
(Castano, Yzerbyt, & Bourguignon, 2003). The SCSC frame-
work would predict that when people are linguistically cat-
egorized by others in a highly entitative category (i.e., by 
frequently being addressed or referred to with a strong noun 
label), this will increase their social identity and in-group 
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search directions. These research questions can be addressed 
by hand coding linguistic variables in natural texts gener-
ated in (dyadic conversations in) experimental studies. How-
ever, current developments in computational methods 
promise more and more opportunities for automated process-
ing of natural language (e.g., Caliskan et al., 2017; Trilling 
& Jonkman (in press); Fokkens et al., 2018; Welbers, Van 
Atteveldt, & Benoit, 2017). The possibility of processing 
specific linguistic variables in large quantities of natural 
language, could provide a major leap forward in research on 
biased language use. It could not only bring unique knowl-
edge to verify the validity of theoretical models of stereotyp-
ing and biased language use, it could also open up major 
opportunities for research in a variety of applied contexts 
(e.g., official forms, news, social media content). Our present 
contribution to integrate concrete, detectable linguistic as-
pects is a first step towards development of automatic pro-
cessing tools to monitor and study implicit biases in natural 
language. 
Practical implications
We have argued that the different types of biases in the 
SCSC framework are geared towards re-confirming existing 
categories and their associated stereotypes, which explains 
why stereotypes are hard to change (Fiske, 1998). However, 
awareness of the linguistic means through which such views 
evolve allows one to develop interventions that can help to 
change or prevent the formation of undesirable category 
stereotypes. Policies or instructions could be effective in 
helping people to refrain from using linguistic labels that 
unnecessarily categorize individuals, or from language that 
reveals and maintains stereotypic expectancies in official 
forms or texts, or (news) media. Intergroup bias and conflict 
can be reduced by strategically changing label use to trans-
form perceptions of group boundaries (e.g., from “us” vs. 
“them” to a more inclusive “we,” Gaertner, Dovidio, Anas-
tasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993). We have also discussed that 
interpersonal responses and norms can prevent the expres-
sion of stereotypic views: Social norms can preclude the use 
of derogatory labels, and audiences can, by means of ex-
plicit questions or critique, push a speaker towards re-cate-
gorizing or individuating a target. When proficiently used, 
such relatively small interventions can play an important 
role in breaking the vicious cycle that maintains existing 
category stereotypes.
identity. Irony about competent and incompetent behaviors 
of in-group and out-group team players can both be used as 
a linguistic tool for aggression towards out-group members, 
and to subtly communicate expectancies about desired in-
group and out-group behavior. Likewise, speakers making 
ironic utterances echoing a negative stereotype of out-group 
members are more appreciated among in-group members 
(van Mulken, Burgers, & van der Plas, 2010). We also predict 
differences in labeling as a result of intergroup dynamics. 
An individual might mainly be labeled as an in-group mem-
ber when he or she shows desirable (vs. undesirable) behavior. 
When in-group members show misdeeds, they might be 
more likely labeled as an uncategorized individual, or a 
subcategory or out-group member. In contrast, when out-
group members show the same misdeeds, they may still be 
labeled under the collective out-group label. 
Finally, it is interesting to study the effects of linguistic 
biases on the target of biased descriptions. So far, we main-
ly focused on communication about absent target(s). Linguis-
tic biases, however, likely also play a role in communication 
with categorized targets who are also the recipient of a de-
scription. When a speaker talks to an addressee about their 
behavior (e.g., providing feedback in educational or profes-
sional settings), linguistic biases in labeling and behavior 
descriptions may reveal that the addressee is being catego-
rized and (implicitly) associated with (negative) stereotypic 
characteristics. Such biases (e.g., particularly based on race, 
gender, sexual orientation) have been described as micro-
aggressions. Micro-aggressions are defined as subtle insults 
directed toward a person that threatens and demeans the 
target (Sue, 2010). While the people perpetrating them are 
usually unaware they are causing harm and often intend no 
offense, targets may be sensitive to such subtle linguistic 
biases. Being stereotyped – albeit by means of subtle linguis-
tic cues – may have several serious effects on targets. It may 
induce them to confirm expectancies as a self-fulfilling 
prophecy (Hummert, Garstka, Ryan, & Bonnesen, 2004), 
can induce impaired performance as a result of stereotype 
threat (Steele, 1997; Shapiro & Neuberg, 2007), can result in 
lower self-esteem (Bourguignon, Yzerbyt, Teixeira, & Her-
man, 2015) and deteriorate mental and physical health 
(Dovidio et al., 2000), but can also improve performance as 
a result of stereotype lift (Walton & Cohen, 2003). The lin-
guistic biases we described have hardly been related to this 
area of research, but can provide interesting insights.
In sum, the SCSC framework opens up various new re-
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orientation categories). The most severe forms of discrimina-
tion, prejudice and intergroup conflict and hostility occur 
when the members of social categories are viewed as very 
similar to each other, when the boundaries that differentiate 
the categories are sharp and fixed (i.e., high entitativity), and 
when they are perceived to have unchangeable and true es-
sential characteristics (Yzerbyt et al., 2004). By explicating 
the linguistic means through which such views (implicitly) 
evolve, this paper facilitates the necessary awareness that 
may allow one to monitor, study, or correct undesirable 
forms of stereotype maintaining language use. 
Conclusion
Social categorization and stereotyping are inextricably 
related to language use. Language reflects which categories 
are singled out as targets for stereotyping, and is one of the 
main carriers of stereotypic information we come to associ-
ate with these categories. Many complex societal problems 
result from social category stereotypes and the affective reac-
tions and behavioral tendencies towards category members 
they may elicit (e.g., prejudice, discrimination, tensions, and 
conflict surrounding ethnic, racial, religious, gender, sexual 
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